Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anna Makkouk sued California Receivership Group and Mark Adams, the group's president, over their work as receiver in a separate action brought by the City of Cypress to abate a public nuisance at her home. Her complaint alleged that they disregarded her abatement efforts, incurred excessive charges, made unnecessary luxurious updates intended to facilitate resale and recover inflated costs, and listed the property at an inadequately low price. Adams supported the defense with a declaration describing his receivership work.
The superior court granted the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. It found that managing renovations, listing the property, and selling it at the price approved in the underlying action furthered the right of petition because court orders authorized those acts. It also connected the work to a public issue because a governmental body had sought nuisance abatement, and concluded that the receiver and his agents had absolute quasi-judicial immunity for damages claims arising from their judicial duties.
Before reaching the merits, the appellate court held that Makkouk timely appealed within 180 days of the January 2025 order. Service of a notice of ruling attaching a tentative ruling did not start the shorter 60-day period applicable to a notice of entry or file-stamped order. The court also rejected reliance on the April 7, 2025 judgment because the anti-SLAPP order was itself appealable and could not be reviewed through an appeal from that later judgment.
The Court’s Holding
Reviewing the anti-SLAPP ruling de novo, the court applied the familiar two-step framework: the defendant first must show that the claim arises from protected activity, after which the plaintiff must establish a probability of prevailing. It affirmed under both steps and explained that its later decision in Semaan v. Mosier, issued after the trial court's ruling, reinforced rather than undermined the analysis.
At the first step, Makkouk's effort to characterize the suit as challenging the manner of performing the receivership, rather than litigation conduct, did not change the result. The alleged unnecessary expenses and low sale price concerned conduct and decisions by a court-appointed receiver in furtherance of petitioning rights. The public-interest connection was especially clear because Cypress had requested the receiver to abate a public nuisance, not merely to manage a business during a private dispute. The court relied on the community-protective purpose of public-nuisance law.
At the second step, the receiver's discretionary decisions about repairs, improvements, and sale price were protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Although that immunity does not cover intentional misconduct such as self-dealing outside the receiver's quasi-judicial capacity, or action in the complete absence of jurisdiction, Makkouk did not show a probability of prevailing on such a theory. Her expert attested to excessive charges but did not find intentional misconduct or self-dealing, and repairing and selling the house fell expressly within the receivers' jurisdiction. The court assumed without deciding that it could consider that expert declaration.
Key Takeaways
- A receiver's performance of court-authorized duties can constitute conduct in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition for anti-SLAPP purposes.
- The public-interest requirement was supported by the City of Cypress's effort to abate a public nuisance affecting community interests.
- Quasi-judicial immunity protected discretionary receiver decisions concerning renovations, improvements, and the property's sale price.
- Evidence of excessive charges alone did not establish a probability of proving intentional misconduct or self-dealing outside the immunity's protection.
- A notice of ruling attaching a tentative ruling did not trigger the shorter appeal deadline, but the later judgment could not be used to obtain review of the separately appealable anti-SLAPP order.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Semaan to a receiver appointed at a city's request to address a public nuisance, linking both the protected-activity and immunity analyses to the receiver's court-supervised public function. It distinguishes that setting from receivership of a business in a purely private dispute and treats implementation of appointment orders as protected conduct rather than merely nonlitigation property management.
The ruling also identifies a practical evidentiary limit for plaintiffs opposing anti-SLAPP motions on immunity grounds: an expert's criticism of receivership charges did not supply the required showing of intentional misconduct or self-dealing. The court left open whether the expert declaration was properly considered, resolving the appeal without deciding that evidentiary question.