Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In June 2009, Emad Aljojo purchased a mixed commercial and residential property on Melrose Avenue in Los Angeles using his own savings and contributions from siblings. In 2016, his brother Adnan Aljojo obtained a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the Melrose property to himself, and in 2017 Adnan transferred it into the Aljojo Revocable Trust, naming himself and his then-wife as trustees. Throughout subsequent proceedings, Adnan repeatedly declared personal 100 percent ownership of the property while concealing that record title sat in the trust.
In March 2022, Emad filed an action under Civil Code section 3412 for cancellation of the 2016 quitclaim deed based on fraud in the factum and non-delivery, establishing that his signature had been forged. Adnan demurred on statute of limitations grounds, but the trial court overruled the demurrer because the complaint was not clearly and affirmatively barred on its face. Following a bench trial held in January 2025, the court found Emad credible, ruled the 2016 deed void due to forgery, and cancelled the instrument. In its final statement of decision filed March 20, 2025, the court applied the three-year fraud limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), but found Adnan failed to meet his burden of proving Emad's claim was time-barred because Adnan offered no evidence showing when Emad discovered the fraud.
After the trial court issued its final statement of decision, Adnan filed for bankruptcy, which was dismissed before judgment was entered on May 22, 2025. Adnan then moved to vacate the judgment, claiming the trust owned the property and was an indispensable party. The trial court denied the motion, finding Adnan forfeited that defense and declining to apply judicial estoppel. While Adnan's appeal was pending, Emad moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to amend the judgment to add Adnan in his capacity as trustee as an additional judgment debtor under the alter ego doctrine. The court granted the motion and entered an amended judgment, which Adnan also appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals and affirmed the judgment in full. The appellate court held that while the three-year fraud statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) governs actions seeking cancellation of instruments grounded in fraud, the trial court properly overruled Adnan's demurrer because the complaint did not affirmatively show on its face when Emad discovered the fraudulent transfer of the Melrose property.
The court also rejected Adnan's judicial estoppel challenge, holding that Emad maintained a consistent position throughout the litigation that Adnan committed fraud, arguing only legal grounds as to which limitations period applied. Furthermore, the court held that Adnan's premature notice of appeal did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction under section 916 to rule on Emad's pending section 187 motion, as premature notices of appeal are properly construed as effective upon entry of the final amended judgment.
Finally, the court affirmed the section 187 postjudgment amendment under the alter ego doctrine. Substantial evidence established a complete unity of interest and control between Adnan and the trust, and disregarding the separate entity prevented Adnan from using the trust to shield property acquired by fraud. The court affirmed the denial of Adnan's motion to vacate, holding he forfeited any objection concerning the failure to name the trustee by litigating the case for years as the purported individual owner.
Key Takeaways
- An action to cancel a forged real property deed is governed by the three-year fraud statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), but a demurrer will not lie unless the complaint affirmatively shows discovery outside the statutory period.
- A litigant who actively defends a property dispute in an individual capacity and conceals a trust's record ownership forfeits the defense that the trustee was an indispensable party who should have been sued in a representative capacity.
- Under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 and the alter ego doctrine, trial courts possess broad equitable authority to amend a judgment postjudgment to add a trustee as a judgment debtor when unity of interest exists and respecting separateness would sanction an inequitable result.
- A premature notice of appeal filed while a postjudgment motion to amend is pending does not trigger an automatic stay divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to enter an amended judgment.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates California courts' pragmatic application of the alter ego doctrine to trusts under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, ensuring that wrongdoers cannot exploit entity separations or strategic trustee resignations to insulate fraudulently obtained real property from adverse judgments.
It also reinforces strict forfeiture rules against defendants who attempt to conceal the true ownership structure during trial only to unveil an indispensable-party defense after losing on the merits.