Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff David Alberts, a tenant at the Celadon residential property in San Diego owned by Bridge Housing Corporation, engaged in tenant advocacy and submitted requests for a grievance hearing and disability accommodations in May and June 2025. On June 10, 2025, defendant Natalie D. Contreras, counsel for Celadon, sent a letter addressing Alberts’s grievance about secondhand smoke and asserting alleged lease violations based on his communications, including ‘repeated use of profanity, harassment, and the public posting of defamatory statements.’ The letter warned of a forthcoming notice to quit. On June 12 and June 16, 2025, defendant Raymund M. Quicho served two notices to permanently perform covenant or quit, citing specific dated incidents of alleged harassment via email and a Facebook group where Alberts posted images of residents and management.
The notices quoted lease provisions prohibiting verbally abusive, profane, or disrespectful behavior. Alberts responded by identifying perceived defects in the notices, including failure to state the property address, specify violation dates, or define the three-day compliance period. He also alleged the notices were retaliatory. No unlawful detainer action was ever filed, and Alberts was not evicted. Alberts sued the KTS Defendants (Kimball, Tirey & St. John LLP, Contreras, and Quicho) based on the June 10 letter and the two notices to quit, asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act and California law.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the KTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims two and three of the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, denying further leave to amend. The court held that the June 10 letter and the two notices to quit are protected petitioning activity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as they are conduct incidental to contemplated litigation. To overcome this immunity, Alberts was required to plead the ‘sham’ exception, which requires showing the contemplated unlawful detainer action was ‘objectively baseless’—meaning no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits—and brought with an improper motive.
The court found that Alberts’s allegations of procedural defects in the notices (e.g., missing address, unspecified compliance period) do not render a contemplated unlawful detainer action objectively baseless, as such flaws could be cured and the notices contained reasonably specific allegations of lease violations supported by dated incidents. The court also held that the failure to file an unlawful detainer action does not establish objective baselessness, but rather relates to the subjective motive prong, which the court need not reach because the first prong fails. Having provided two prior opportunities to amend these claims, the court concluded further amendment would be futile.
Key Takeaways
- Pre-litigation demand letters and notices to quit sent by attorneys on behalf of a landlord are protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as conduct incidental to petitioning the courts.
- The ‘sham’ exception to Noerr-Pennington requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the contemplated litigation was ‘objectively baseless’—i.e., no reasonable litigant could expect success—not merely that the pre-suit notices contained procedural or formal defects.
- Defects in a notice to quit that could be cured by amendment (such as adding a landlord name or specifying dates) do not render a contemplated unlawful detainer action objectively baseless.
- The fact that a threatened lawsuit is never filed is relevant to the subjective motive prong of the sham exception, but does not satisfy the threshold requirement of objective baselessness.
- A district court may deny leave to amend after multiple opportunities where the plaintiff fails to cure identified pleading deficiencies, indicating futility.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the robust protection the Noerr-Pennington doctrine affords to pre-litigation communications in the landlord-tenant context. By holding that procedural defects in notices to quit—even multiple defects identified by the tenant—do not make a contemplated eviction lawsuit ‘objectively baseless,’ the court sets a high bar for tenants seeking to pursue claims against landlords and their attorneys for sending such notices.
The ruling clarifies that the objective baselessness inquiry focuses on the merits of the potential underlying claim (here, whether the alleged conduct could constitute a lease violation), not the technical sufficiency of the pre-suit notice. It also illustrates the court’s willingness to deny further amendment after repeated failures to plead the sham exception, emphasizing that plaintiffs cannot rely on notice defects alone to sustain a claim for retaliation or discrimination based on protected petitioning activity.