Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
The Los Angeles County Office of the Public Guardian petitioned on August 25, 2025 for appointment of a conservator of J.B.'s person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. At the initial September 17 hearing, J.B. was present and represented by appointed counsel. Counsel said he had discussed her conservatorship-process rights and that she waived further advisement, but J.B. interjected that she did not want to give up her rights. The court clarified that she was waiving only further advisement, not any rights. J.B. also raised concerns about a habeas corpus petition and said she wanted release from Adventist Health Glendale without a conservatorship trial; the court explained that she could not avoid both a trial and the potential conservatorship.
Counsel then told the court that J.B. wanted a judge trial and confirmed that he had advised her about a trial before 12 community members. The court asked counsel whether J.B. understood that the evidence and confrontation rights would be the same but preferred a judicial officer, and J.B. answered, "Correct." The court accepted the jury-trial waiver as knowing and voluntary. At the October 29 court trial, psychiatrist Yelena Koldobskaya testified for the Public Guardian that J.B. had schizophrenia, lacked insight, refused offered medication, and was gravely disabled. J.B. declined to testify but read a statement asserting her decision-making capacity and objection to medication. The court found her gravely disabled, appointed her father as conservator, ordered secured placement through October 29, 2026, and J.B. timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal explained that the LPS Act permits a conservatorship for a person found gravely disabled, but protects the resulting liberty interests with counsel, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to demand a jury trial with a unanimous verdict. Probate Code section 1828, incorporated into the LPS framework, requires the court to inform the proposed conservatee of the jury-trial right. The court reviewed the statutory-advisement and waiver-validity issues de novo, while reviewing a finding that a waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary for substantial evidence.
The opinion acknowledged an appellate split over whether counsel may waive a jury trial for a proposed conservatee. Joanne R. requires a personal waiver, Heather W. permits counsel's waiver only when the conservatee lacks capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, and C.O. takes a more permissive approach absent circumstances undermining counsel's authority. Under the circumstances here, the court followed Joanne R. and Heather W. and required a personal waiver from J.B. Although she answered "correct" during an exchange principally directed to counsel, she never stated that she waived a jury trial. The court therefore concluded that the trial court failed to obtain the required personal waiver.
The Public Guardian argued that the advisement was sufficient and that any error was harmless because J.B. actively engaged with the court. The Court of Appeal rejected ordinary Watson harmless-error analysis, relying on Blackburn and civil-commitment decisions treating failure to obtain a required personal jury-trial waiver as tantamount to denial of a jury trial. Speculation about whether J.B. would have chosen a jury or how that choice would have affected the outcome could not resolve prejudice. The failure therefore constituted a miscarriage of justice under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution and required reversal without assessing the strength of the grave-disability evidence.
Key Takeaways
- A proposed LPS conservatee's agreement that counsel discussed jury and court trials did not, on this record, amount to a personal waiver of the jury-trial right.
- The Court of Appeal followed decisions requiring a personal jury-trial waiver while expressly recognizing that California appellate courts are divided on counsel's authority to waive that right.
- Failure to obtain the required personal waiver was treated as tantamount to denial of a jury trial and was not subject to ordinary harmless-error analysis.
- The appellate court reversed the conservatorship judgment without deciding whether the psychiatric evidence sufficiently established grave disability.
- On remand, the trial court must advise J.B. of her jury-trial right so she can decide whether to demand a jury or waive it and proceed before the court.
Why It Matters
The decision applies established civil-commitment safeguards to a recurring practical problem: a courtroom exchange with counsel may confirm that advice occurred without establishing that the proposed conservatee personally relinquished a jury trial. It also shows why active participation and agreement with an advisement do not necessarily cure the omission.
The disposition is a reversal with specific instructions for a renewed choice between jury and court trial, not an appellate determination that J.B. was not gravely disabled or an order ending all conservatorship proceedings. The opinion was filed October 15, 2026 and is marked not to be published in the official reports.