Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Vrej S.G., a former federal detainee represented by counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on June 9, 2026. The Eastern District of California entered judgment in his favor and ordered his immediate release on July 15, 2026. He then moved for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which generally provides fees to prevailing private litigants in nontort civil actions against the United States unless the government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust.
The parties did not dispute that S.G. had prevailed, filed his fee motion on time, or that the government's position lacked substantial justification. Respondents instead sought to hold the motion in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Montoya Palacios v. Liggins, which concerns whether EAJA's phrase 'any civil action' includes habeas challenges to civil immigration detention. They also argued that habeas proceedings are not civil actions under EAJA and that fees would be unjust because petitioner's counsel worked for the Contra Costa County Office of the Public Defender.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the requested abeyance. Although a district court may stay proceedings while the Supreme Court considers a controlling legal issue, it must weigh possible damage from a stay, hardship or inequity from proceeding, and the orderly course of justice. After reviewing numerous district decisions that had declined similar stays, the court agreed with their analysis and outcomes and found a stay inappropriate here.
On the merits, the court again concluded that habeas proceedings challenging immigration detention are 'civil actions' under EAJA. It relied on Ninth Circuit application of EAJA to immigration habeas proceedings and on reasoning combining the Supreme Court's description of habeas as technically civil with the statute's broad reference to any civil action other than tort cases. The government's contrary arguments did not persuade the court that the accumulated decisions were wrong.
The court also rejected the claimed special circumstances. The government supplied no binding authority barring EAJA fees when counsel receives a publicly funded salary, and counsel stated that they would personally receive no part of an award. Applying the lodestar approach, the court found the statutory hourly rate of $258.46 reasonable and determined that 28.0 hours was a reasonable expenditure, a total respondents did not dispute. It therefore granted $7,236.88, subject to an administrative offset for any pre-existing debt S.G. owes the United States.
Key Takeaways
- A pending Supreme Court case about EAJA's coverage of immigration habeas proceedings did not justify delaying this fee motion.
- The court held that immigration detention habeas proceedings qualify as civil actions under EAJA under current Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.
- Public funding of counsel's salary did not establish special circumstances making a fee award unjust, particularly where counsel would not personally receive the award.
- The court calculated the award using 28.0 reasonable hours at the statutory rate of $258.46 per hour, producing $7,236.88.
- Payment remains subject to a government administrative offset for any qualifying pre-existing debt owed by the petitioner to the United States.
Why It Matters
The order applies existing Ninth Circuit and district precedent rather than postponing a prevailing immigration habeas petitioner's fee request until the Supreme Court resolves Montoya Palacios. On the specific facts presented, it also confirms that representation by a county public defender's office did not, without supporting authority or other special circumstances, defeat EAJA eligibility.
The decision provides a concrete application of the lodestar method in an immigration habeas case: an uncontested 28-hour submission at the statutory rate yielded $7,236.88. The court did not decide any higher-rate request because counsel sought only the statutory rate, and it preserved the government's statutory ability to offset qualifying pre-existing debt.