Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Vinod Rao filed two habeas corpus petitions in August 2024 challenging his removal order and detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The cases, initially docketed separately as Rao v. LaRose (24-cv-1562) and Rao v. Byers (24-cv-1576), were consolidated after Rao filed a Second Amended Petition on September 16, 2024. Rao sought to vacate the inadmissibility determination and requested release or removal on the first available transport.
The court issued a briefing schedule on November 20, 2024. Respondents filed a Return on December 27, 2024, and Rao filed a Traverse on January 10, 2025. In their Return, Respondents argued the petition was moot and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Rao had already been removed from the country.
The procedural posture is significant: Rao's removal occurred on September 18, 2024, before the court even issued its briefing schedule. This timing meant that the parties briefed a petition that had already become moot, and the court ultimately resolved the matter on jurisdictional grounds rather than reaching the merits of Rao's underlying immigration claims.
The Court’s Holding
The court agreed with Respondents that Rao's habeas petition was moot. The government submitted evidence demonstrating that Rao was removed from the United States on September 18, 2024—before the briefing schedule was even issued. The court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2007), which held that a habeas petition challenging only the length of detention, as distinguished from the lawfulness of the deportation order, becomes moot upon the petitioner's removal.
The court also cited Ochoa v. Warden, Golden State Annex Det. Facility, a 2026 Eastern District of California decision reaching the same conclusion. Because Rao's petition challenged his detention rather than the validity of the removal order itself, his physical removal from the country rendered the request for immediate release moot.
The court denied the Section 2241 petition and directed the Clerk to close the case. The disposition was a denial as moot rather than a dismissal, reflecting the court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested once Rao was no longer in ICE custody.
Key Takeaways
- A habeas corpus petition challenging only the length of immigration detention becomes moot upon the petitioner's removal from the United States.
- The court distinguishes between challenges to detention length and challenges to the lawfulness of the removal order itself; only the latter may survive removal.
- The government's submission of removal documentation (ECF No. 16-1 at 16–17) was sufficient to establish mootness.
- The petition was denied as moot and the case was closed on October 22, 2026.
- The court's reliance on both binding Ninth Circuit precedent and a recent district court decision demonstrates the settled nature of this mootness principle in immigration habeas litigation.
Why It Matters
This order applies established Ninth Circuit mootness doctrine to a consolidated habeas action, reinforcing that physical removal terminates the court's ability to grant meaningful relief on detention-length claims. The decision underscores the importance of timely filing and the strategic distinction between challenging detention conditions versus the underlying removal order.
Practitioners should note that once a noncitizen is removed, Section 2241 petitions seeking release from custody are routinely dismissed as moot unless they directly attack the removal order's validity. The court's citation to both Abdala and the 2026 Ochoa decision signals that this principle remains firmly entrenched in the Ninth Circuit's immigration habeas jurisprudence.