Reported / Citable
Background
Andres Sanchez was convicted by a jury on six counts of preparing and presenting false and fraudulent tax returns. During deliberations, it came to light that one juror—Juror 5—had made racially biased comments to other jurors. The district court questioned the remaining jurors, excused Juror 5, and allowed the remaining eleven jurors to continue deliberating and return a verdict.
Sanchez moved for a mistrial before the verdict and for a new trial afterward. The district court denied both motions. It applied the standard from United States v. Sarkisian (9th Cir. 1999), asking whether the other jurors’ exposure to the biased comments “so affected the jury’s ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict.” The court concluded the answer was no and let the conviction stand.
Sanchez appealed, arguing that the presence of a racially biased juror during most of the deliberations violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The central legal question was what framework courts should apply when a biased juror is identified and removed before the final verdict.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. Writing for the majority, Judge Sung held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard. The court rejected two competing frameworks and adopted a third.
First, the panel declined to apply Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), under which the presence of a biased juror would be treated as “structural error” requiring automatic reversal—reasoning that Dyer’s per se rule applies only when a biased juror actually participates in the final verdict. Second, the panel held that the Sarkisian standard the district court used was insufficient because it placed no affirmative burden on the government and underweighted the gravity of racial bias in the jury room.
Instead, the panel adopted the framework from United States v. Remmer (1954), which creates a “heavy presumption of prejudice” when jury integrity is compromised. Under Remmer, once a defendant shows that a racially biased juror participated in deliberations, the burden shifts to the government to prove the bias did not affect the verdict. The court found the government failed to carry that burden: at least two jurors heard biased comments but did not perceive them as biased—suggesting the racial prejudice may have been absorbed rather than rejected. Judge Bea dissented in part, arguing the majority overruled binding Sarkisian precedent and created an “insurmountable” standard for the government.
Key Takeaways
- When a racially biased juror is discovered and removed before the court accepts a verdict, the Remmer framework applies: there is a heavy presumption of prejudice, and the government bears the burden of proving the bias did not affect the verdict.
- The Sarkisian standard—which merely asked whether biased comments “tainted” the verdict without shifting the burden—is no longer the controlling test in the Ninth Circuit for cases involving racial bias.
- A juror’s good-faith belief in their own impartiality is not dispositive; courts must consider whether jurors may have absorbed racial bias without recognizing it.
- Structural error under Dyer v. Calderon remains limited to situations where a biased juror actually participates in the final verdict—removal before verdict acceptance avoids per se reversal but triggers the Remmer presumption instead.
- Trial courts discovering juror bias mid-deliberation should conduct thorough inquiries that account for the possibility that other jurors may not subjectively perceive biased statements as biased.
Why It Matters
This published opinion significantly raises the bar for the government in any Ninth Circuit criminal case where juror racial bias surfaces during trial. Defense attorneys now have a powerful tool: once they establish that a biased juror participated in deliberations, the presumption of prejudice shifts the burden entirely to the prosecution. Given the court’s observation that jurors may absorb racial bias without consciously recognizing it, overcoming this presumption will be difficult in practice.
For trial judges, the opinion is a practical roadmap for handling mid-deliberation bias discoveries. Excusing the biased juror is necessary but may not be sufficient—the court must probe whether the bias has already contaminated the remaining jurors’ reasoning, and juror self-assessments of impartiality will receive skeptical scrutiny. Prosecutors and defense counsel litigating in California’s federal courts should treat this decision as the new framework for any juror-bias challenge going forward.