Reported / Citable
Background
Mark Ridley-Thomas, a former Los Angeles County supervisor, appealed convictions for conspiracy, bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, and five counts of honest-services mail and wire fraud. The case concerned his dealings with Marilyn Flynn, then dean of USC’s School of Social Work. The jury accepted one alleged exchange: Flynn facilitated a $100,000 donation of university funds to the nonprofit employing Ridley-Thomas’s son Sebastian in return for Ridley-Thomas’s support of a County-USC telehealth contract. It acquitted him on fraud counts based on Sebastian’s admission, scholarship, or professorship.
The opinion describes a sequence in which Ridley-Thomas sought educational and employment opportunities for Sebastian while Flynn pursued County contracts to address USC’s budget deficit. After Community Partners returned an earlier $100,000 campaign payment amid concerns about nepotism, Sebastian established the Policy, Research & Practice Initiative, with United Ways as fiscal sponsor. Ridley-Thomas donated $100,000 to USC, which then paid $100,000 to United Ways. Flynn made misrepresentations within USC about that payment, and Ridley-Thomas later voted for the amended telehealth contract.
On appeal, Ridley-Thomas challenged the thing-of-value theory, materiality evidence, four jury-instruction rulings, and the conspiracy conviction, and argued that race and gender together motivated the prosecution’s strikes of the only two Black female prospective jurors. The amended opinion addresses those challenges; the accompanying order denies his rehearing petitions.
The Court’s Holding
The panel held that the funneling service was a thing of value under both 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and § 666(a)(1)(B). Evidence showed that Ridley-Thomas subjectively valued a swift, indirect transfer benefiting Sebastian while concealing its source, particularly after the earlier direct payment was returned. The court rejected the argument that the theory rested merely on reputational benefit: the indictment and trial theory identified the $100,000 transfer as a quid in the bribery scheme. Neither personal enrichment by the official nor a personal benefit to every participant was required.
The materiality evidence was also sufficient. A rational juror could find that other supervisors, had they known of the scheme, might have changed their votes on the telehealth amendment; the government did not need direct evidence of constituents’ approval or disapproval. The panel found no instructional error. Requiring an intent to defraud incorporated deceptive intent, the bribery instructions required an exchange for an official act, and the honest-services verdict independently confirmed a quid pro quo. A separate lawful-ingratiation instruction was unnecessary on this record. Because the underlying fraud and bribery convictions rested on legally valid objects, the conspiracy conviction also stood.
The panel declined to extend Batson to intersectional race-and-gender claims. On the race-based challenges, it found no clear error in the district court’s rulings on the two strikes. The judgment was affirmed, and the November 6, 2026 order denied rehearing after amending the opinion.
Key Takeaways
- A payment routed through intermediaries can be a thing of value even when the public official does not personally receive the money.
- The court treated the concealed transfer service benefiting the defendant’s son as part of a quid pro quo, not merely an intangible reputational advantage.
- Materiality did not require direct testimony about constituents’ views because a rational jury could infer that disclosure would have changed other supervisors’ conduct.
- The honest-services guilty verdict supplied a quid-pro-quo finding that defeated any claimed prejudice from the federal-program bribery instruction.
- The panel declined to recognize an intersectional Batson claim and upheld the district court’s race-based rulings under clear-error review.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Skilling’s bribery-and-kickback framework to an indirect payment arrangement rather than a conventional cash payment to an official. Its analysis focuses on the value of the intermediary’s service, the benefit to a third party, and evidence connecting that benefit to official action. It also explains why campaign-finance legality or the theoretical ability to donate directly did not defeat the prosecution’s theory on this record.
The opinion consolidates the court’s approach to deceptive-intent, gratuity, quid-pro-quo, and ingratiation instructions. Its Batson ruling leaves intersectional claims unrecognized while upholding the race-based rulings. The amended disposition affirms all seven convictions and denies rehearing.