Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Robert Quincy Thomas, who appears pro se and in forma pauperis, sued J. Loftin, J. Whitlow, T. Hodge, and N. St. Andre under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eastern District of California. His complaint pleaded three claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, including allegations of excessive force. It stated that he was suing each defendant in their official and individual capacity. It also mentioned in passing that he is disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the third claim asserted that defendants' actions violated that statute.
The court's earlier screening order of August 12, 2026 found that the case proceeds solely on the Eighth Amendment claims and that the Fourteenth Amendment claims are subsumed by the Eighth. On October 19, 2026, defendants moved for more time to file a responsive pleading. They also asked the court to clarify whether plaintiff may proceed only against them in their individual capacities and how the complaint's ADA references should be treated. Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim resolved the motion in an order combined with findings and recommendations dated October 21, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The order portion is binding now. The court found good cause, granted the motion for clarification and for an extension, and directed the Clerk to assign a district judge. It also required defendants to file and serve a response to the complaint within twenty-one days of the order.
The court's findings on the two clarification questions are recommendations to the assigned district judge, not final rulings. On capacity, the court reasoned that damages claims against a state's officers for official-capacity actions are barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless the state waives immunity. It cited Kentucky v. Graham and Quern v. Jordan, and noted that § 1983 does not abrogate that immunity. It also recognized, citing Hafer v. Melo, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar individual-capacity suits or official-capacity suits for prospective injunctive relief. It therefore recommended dismissing the claims for monetary damages against the four defendants in their official capacity. The order does not discuss any request for prospective relief.
On the ADA, the court found that the complaint labels its three claims as Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and contains no separate ADA claim. It added that plaintiff seeks only money damages, which are generally unavailable under the ADA. It also noted that he named no public entity defendant and alleged no facts showing exclusion from, or denial of the benefits of, a public entity's services, programs, or activities because of disability. Citing Thompson v. Davis and Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, it concluded that the excessive-force allegations are governed by the Eighth Amendment, not the ADA. It recommended dismissing any putative ADA claim. The order does not say whether leave to amend would be allowed. Any party may file objections within fourteen days of service, and failure to object may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
Key Takeaways
- A pro se plaintiff's statement that he sues state officials in their official capacity does not preserve a claim for money damages, because the Eleventh Amendment bars it absent a state waiver.
- The Eleventh Amendment does not bar individual-capacity damages suits against state officials or official-capacity suits for prospective injunctive relief.
- Passing references to disability do not state an ADA claim, which requires facts showing discrimination or exclusion by a public entity because of disability.
- Excessive-force allegations are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment rather than the ADA.
- The dismissal rulings are only recommendations until the district judge acts, so timely objections within fourteen days matter to preserve appellate rights.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unreported procedural order in a single prisoner civil rights case and carries no precedential weight. Its practical effect is to narrow the case. If the district judge adopts the recommendations, the action will proceed on the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims against the named defendants in their individual capacities. The order applies familiar Eleventh Amendment and ADA principles to a pro se complaint.
Nothing is final yet. The district judge must still rule on the findings and recommendations after the objection period, and defendants' response to the complaint is due within twenty-one days of the order. The merits of the Eighth Amendment claims have not been addressed.