Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ricardo Flores, a citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States in 1990, pleaded guilty in 2002 to felony unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than he was. His plea form included an advisement that deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization could result from the conviction. An interpreter signed an attestation that the form had been interpreted into Spanish, and Flores's attorney attested that she had read and explained its contents to him. In 2008, the court reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor, set it aside, entered a not-guilty plea, and dismissed the case under Penal Code section 1203.4.
In 2017, as part of an application for a U visa, Flores submitted Form I-192 seeking advance permission to enter as a nonimmigrant. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied that application in December 2024, placing heavy emphasis on the 2002 conviction. Flores then moved to vacate the conviction under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, although he apparently abandoned the section 1016.5 claim. At an October 2025 hearing, the trial court treated the proceeding as a prima facie screening before an evidentiary hearing. It denied the motion without prejudice, finding the evidence insufficient and concluding that Flores had not shown adverse immigration consequences such as removal or deportation.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal exercised independent review and identified two legal errors. Section 1473.7, subdivision (f)(1), requires a movant proceeding under subdivision (a)(1) to establish that the challenged conviction is currently causing, or has the potential to cause, removal or denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization. That language is broader than the trial court's repeated focus on removal or deportation. The court also erred by treating the USCIS denial of Form I-192 as something other than an adverse immigration consequence. The appellate court clarified that the letter denied a waiver of inadmissibility connected to the U visa process, not the U visa itself. The People acknowledged that defendant was 'likely correct' that the trial court committed these two errors.
The court further rejected the trial court's emphasis on whether USCIS had acted discretionarily. Under the statute's plain language, the relevant question is whether the conviction is causing removal or denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization, not whether the federal decision involved discretion. Although the Attorney General argued that the appellate court could affirm the ruling despite its reasoning, the court declined to decide the merits before the trial court could apply the correct standard. It reversed and remanded, stating that Flores had met his burden under subdivision (f)(1), while leaving the trial court to determine whether he qualifies for relief. The court also instructed that remand requires a hearing on the evidence, not another prima facie screening, because section 1473.7 entitles all motions to a hearing.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1473.7 does not limit qualifying immigration consequences to removal or deportation.
- Denial of an application for an immigration benefit or lawful status can satisfy the statute's subdivision (f)(1) requirement.
- Whether USCIS exercised discretion does not determine whether a conviction is causing a denial covered by section 1473.7.
- The appellate court did not order the conviction vacated or resolve every remaining requirement for relief.
- On remand, the trial court must hold an evidence-based hearing rather than require a separate prima facie showing before granting a hearing.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes the threshold showing that a conviction is causing or could cause specified immigration consequences from the ultimate entitlement to vacatur. Flores established the subdivision (f)(1) component through the immigration-benefit denial, but the trial court must still assess his motion under the correct legal framework, including the statutory requirements concerning meaningful understanding and prejudicial error. Because the appellate court applied independent review, it exercised its own judgment on whether the facts satisfy the rule of law rather than deferring to the trial court's legal conclusion.
The opinion also corrects two recurring procedural and factual misunderstandings: a Form I-192 inadmissibility-waiver denial is not itself a U visa denial, and section 1473.7 contains no two-step prima facie screening requirement before an evidentiary hearing. The judgment therefore restores the motion for a proper hearing and merits determination rather than granting Flores immediate vacatur.