Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A Los Angeles County jury convicted Martel Rashon Neal of nine offenses arising from crimes against several women and D.J.'s young son, M.J. The convictions included human trafficking and pimping D.J., kidnapping M.J. for ransom, kidnapping D.J., forcibly orally copulating and sodomizing D.J., misdemeanor sexual battery of E.L., and forcible oral copulation and rape of Sheila. The jury found aggravating circumstances and one-strike allegations true, and the trial court sentenced Neal to a prison term of 20 years six months plus 87 years to life.
The prosecution's evidence showed Neal used violence and threats to compel D.J. to perform commercial sex work and surrender the proceeds. D.J. left M.J. with Neal because she feared being hurt, and Neal threatened the child when she disobeyed. After she tried to escape on September 22, 2021, Neal dragged her from outside the apartment building through a hallway and back inside, where he abused and sexually assaulted her, then told her that without money she would not see her son.
The prosecution also presented V.C.'s testimony about an uncharged 2015 sexual assault; V.C. identified Neal, and DNA analysis matched him to her assailant. On appeal, Neal challenged the prior-misconduct evidence, the human-trafficking instruction, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the kidnapping-for-ransom conviction, the simple-kidnapping and one-strike findings, and the absence of a unanimity instruction on forcible sodomy.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal held that admitting V.C.'s testimony under Evidence Code section 1108 was not an abuse of discretion. The prior assault shared probative features with the charged crimes, including isolation, coercive sexual conduct, and methods of obtaining victims' phone numbers. It was not too remote, and its facts were no more inflammatory than the charged abuse. Limiting instructions confined the propensity evidence to specified sexual offenses, so the court presumed the jury did not use it on the trafficking or pimping counts. The court stated it need not decide whether the evidence was also admissible under section 1101(b).
The court rejected Neal's argument that CALCRIM No. 1243 omitted nonconsent as an element of trafficking an adult. Following People v. Oliver, it held that section 236.1(b) requires deprivation or violation of personal liberty with intent to effect or maintain pimping but does not require the People to prove the adult victim did not consent. The court also found substantial evidence supported the findings that D.J. did not consent to Neal taking M.J. and that Neal held or detained M.J. to obtain something of value from D.J.; Neal's babysitter characterization improperly asked the appellate court to reweigh credibility.
Substantial evidence supported simple kidnapping because Neal moved D.J. from public view into a private apartment, substantially changing her environment, reducing detection, and increasing danger and opportunities for further crimes. That movement was not merely incidental to the subsequent sexual offenses and substantially increased the risk of harm beyond that inherent in them, supporting the one-strike findings. No unanimity instruction was required because the prosecutor tied the sodomy count to the specific act committed after D.J.'s final escape attempt. The judgment was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence Code section 1108 permitted testimony about Neal's uncharged sexual assault because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.
- Penal Code section 236.1(b) does not require the People to prove lack of consent for adult human trafficking with intent to commit pimping.
- Threats against a mother and her child supported findings that she did not consent to Neal taking the child and that Neal detained the child to obtain something of value.
- Moving a victim from public view into a private apartment can constitute substantial kidnapping movement and support an increased-risk finding under the one-strike law.
- A prosecutor's election tying a count to one specific act can eliminate the need for a separate jury-unanimity instruction.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision applies established California precedent holding that lack of consent is not an element of adult human trafficking under section 236.1(b). It also illustrates how prior sexual-offense evidence may survive section 352 scrutiny when similarities, corroboration, timing, and the comparative inflammatory nature of the evidence support admission.
The kidnapping analysis emphasizes environment and risk rather than distance alone. Movement into a private enclosure supported both simple kidnapping and the one-strike allegation because it reduced detection, complicated escape, and facilitated additional violence. The court resolved only the issues necessary to affirm and stated it need not decide the alternative section 1101(b) admissibility question.