Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A jury convicted Juan Alejandro Ramirez of 18 counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under 14 by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1). The victim was his stepdaughter, identified as M., who was between 11 and 13 during the abuse. The jury also found true three aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a): the victim was particularly vulnerable, the crimes showed planning and sophistication, and Ramirez took advantage of a position of trust. The trial court imposed the maximum 10-year term on each count, consecutively, for an aggregate of 180 years.
At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from M., her mother R., and Dr. Tiffany Anderson, a psychologist who testified as an expert on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. Anderson explained general concepts—delayed disclosure, secrecy, helplessness, accommodation, and dissociation—without knowing case-specific facts. The defense moved to exclude the CSAAS testimony as unreliable 'junk science,' but the trial court admitted it, finding it offered valuable generalized information about counterintuitive behaviors of abused children.
On appeal, Ramirez raised three arguments: the CSAAS expert testimony was improperly admitted; CALCRIM No. 1193 erroneously told the jury it could use CSAAS evidence to prove the truth of the charges; and the maximum sentence violated his constitutional rights because he declared his innocence at sentencing rather than expressing remorse.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal rejected all three arguments and affirmed. On CSAAS, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the admissibility and reliability of CSAAS evidence is well settled in California for the limited purpose of disabusing juries of misconceptions about how children react to molestation, and out-of-state decisions reaching different conclusions do not affect binding California Supreme Court precedent in People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289. The court also found the testimony was not unduly prejudicial, because evidence is not prejudicial merely because it harms the defendant's case.
On CALCRIM No. 1193, the court found no instructional error. As given, the instruction told jurors that CSAAS testimony was not evidence Ramirez committed the charged crimes and could be considered only in deciding whether M.'s conduct was consistent with someone who had been molested and in evaluating her believability. Following People v. Gonzalez (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, the court reasoned a reasonable juror would understand the evidence neutralizes apparently self-impeaching behavior but cannot be used to conclude the victim was in fact molested; there is no conflict in the instruction.
On sentencing, the court found no abuse of discretion. The trial court did not use lack of remorse as an aggravating factor; it indicated it would consider remorse as mitigation had Ramirez expressed any, but he did not, leaving only his lack of a prior criminal record. The court weighed that against the three aggravating factors found true by the jury and concluded aggravation far outweighed mitigation, a proper basis for the upper term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
Key Takeaways
- CSAAS expert testimony remains admissible in California for the limited purpose of dispelling misconceptions about child sexual abuse victims' behavior, and out-of-state decisions rejecting it do not undermine binding California Supreme Court precedent.
- CALCRIM No. 1193 properly instructs that CSAAS evidence may be used to evaluate a victim's believability and consistency with abuse, but not as evidence the defendant committed the charged crimes.
- A trial court does not abuse its discretion by imposing an upper-term sentence based on jury-found aggravating factors after considering whether the defendant's sentencing statements offer any mitigation.
- Lack of remorse is not itself an aggravating factor, but a court may treat its absence as the lack of a mitigating circumstance when weighing aggravation.
- Evidence is not unduly prejudicial merely because it is harmful to the defendant; undue prejudice requires emotional bias with relatively little probative importance on the specific issues.
Why It Matters
This unpublished opinion reaffirms California's settled framework for admitting CSAAS expert testimony and applying CALCRIM No. 1193, rejecting efforts to import out-of-state skepticism about the syndrome's reliability. It also clarifies the sentencing distinction between improperly using lack of remorse as aggravation and properly treating its absence as the lack of mitigation when a jury has found aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt.