Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Silah Muhamad filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Respondents, including the Secretary of Homeland Security, agree that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) but argue that he should be required to exhaust administrative remedies by requesting a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
On October 14, 2026, the Court issued an Order requiring Petitioner to file a supplemental brief explaining why the prudential exhaustion requirement should be excused in his case, including any relevant information such as whether he had already requested a bond hearing since the Petition became fully briefed. The Court set a deadline of October 21, 2026 for the filing. As of October 22, 2026, Petitioner had not filed the required reply.
The case is before the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, with the docket number 3:26-cv-05346-RBM-JLB. The initials in the case number reflect the assignment to District Judge Ruth Bermudez Montenegro and Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt. The procedural posture is at the pre-merits stage, with the Court focused on the threshold question of whether Petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing federal habeas relief.
The Court’s Holding
The Court issued a second order directing Petitioner to file the supplemental brief in accordance with the previous Order (Doc. 5). The Court set a new deadline of October 26, 2026 for Petitioner to file his reply. The Court explicitly cautioned Petitioner that failure to respond to arguments made in an opposition brief may result in a claim being deemed abandoned, citing Ninth Circuit precedent from Sabra v. Maricopa County Community College District, 44 F.4th 867, 881 (9th Cir. 2022).
The Order does not rule on the merits of the habeas petition, the applicability of the prudential exhaustion requirement, or the legality of Petitioner's detention. It is strictly a case management order enforcing compliance with the Court's prior directive for supplemental briefing on the exhaustion issue. The Court retains jurisdiction over the underlying petition pending Petitioner's compliance.
The Court's citation to Sabra was overruled on other grounds by Arizona Alliance for Retired Americans v. Mayes, 186 F.4th 622 (9th Cir. 2026), but the abandonment principle remains applicable. The Court's warning signals that Petitioner's failure to file the required reply could result in the entire habeas claim being deemed abandoned, not merely the exhaustion argument.
Key Takeaways
- The Court has twice ordered Petitioner to address why prudential exhaustion should be excused in his § 2241 challenge to immigration detention under § 1226(a).
- Petitioner missed the initial October 21, 2026 deadline for the supplemental brief, prompting this second order with a final deadline of October 26, 2026.
- The Court warned that failure to respond to Respondents' exhaustion argument may result in Petitioner's claim being deemed abandoned under Ninth Circuit law.
- The underlying habeas petition challenges detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on statutory and Fifth Amendment due process grounds.
- Respondents concede detention is under § 1226(a) but insist Petitioner must first request a bond hearing from an immigration judge.
Why It Matters
This procedural order highlights the Court's insistence on compliance with briefing schedules and the potential consequences of failing to address exhaustion arguments in immigration habeas cases. The Court's citation of Sabra signals that Petitioner's entire claim—not just the exhaustion issue—could be deemed abandoned if he fails to file the required reply.
The Order also frames the central procedural dispute: whether a detainee under § 1226(a) must request a bond hearing before an immigration judge before seeking federal habeas relief, a question the Court has not yet reached on the merits. The Court's repeated orders suggest it views the exhaustion question as a threshold issue that must be resolved before considering the merits of the detention challenge. This case illustrates the tension between the prudential exhaustion doctrine and the constitutional protections available through habeas corpus in the immigration detention context.