California Case Summaries

Shorty v. Ramirez — Service on a Prison Litigation Coordinator Does Not Validly Serve Individual Officers, So Defaults Are Set Aside

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Shorty v. Ramirez
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
Brian J. White (Judges of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, 2025)
Date Decided
2026-10-19
Docket No.
3:25-cv-00656
Status
Unreported
Topics
service of process, Rule 4(e), entry of default, Rule 55(c), substituted service, Rule 4(m), pro se prisoner, personal jurisdiction

Background

Aerick Wayne Shorty, a pro se prisoner at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a warden, two correctional officers, and Doe defendants subjected him to sexually intrusive and retaliatory searches of his body and cell. On screening, the court dismissed the claims against the warden and the Does, but allowed a First Amendment retaliation claim against Ramirez and an Eighth Amendment sexual-abuse claim against Estrada to proceed, and directed Plaintiff to serve each defendant. The service deadline was extended to October 1, 2025.

In September 2025 Plaintiff filed proofs of service stating that he delivered the papers to the prison's litigation coordinator, described as designated by law to accept service for the institution. The Clerk entered default against both officers on June 16, 2026, and Plaintiff moved for default judgment two weeks later. Ramirez, who says his correct name is E. Ramirez, moved to set aside the default. He declared that he was never personally served, never authorized the coordinator to accept service for him, no longer works at the prison, and first learned of the case in late June 2026. Defense counsel stated that the corrections department could not identify an officer named E. Estrada on Plaintiff's yard at the relevant time, while Plaintiff said grievance records consistently named such an officer.

The Court’s Holding

The magistrate judge held that, once service was challenged, Plaintiff had not shown valid service on Ramirez. The return identified the coordinator as authorized to accept service for the prison, not for Ramirez individually, and authority to receive service for an institution does not by itself establish authority to receive it for an employee. Substituted service under California Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b) also failed: the record did not show reasonably diligent attempts at personal service, that the prison was Ramirez's usual place of business at the time, that the coordinator was told the contents, or a follow-up mailing to Ramirez. The only later mailing was addressed to the Clerk of Court. Because Ramirez's time to respond never began to run, the default could not rest on his failure to respond. The court set it aside without deciding whether the equitable Rule 55(c) factors independently favored relief.

Because Plaintiff sought default judgment against Estrada, and the court must confirm personal jurisdiction first, the court acted on its own motion, with notice to Plaintiff, and reached the same result. It set aside Estrada's default and quashed the service reflected in ECF No. 12, but did not dismiss him. It extended the Rule 4(m) period by sixty days, within which Plaintiff must serve Estrada and file proof, file a waiver of service, or file a supported motion explaining his efforts and the help he seeks, such as limited identification discovery, correction of the name, or Marshals Service assistance. A timely motion satisfies the deadline pending a ruling, and noncompliance may lead to dismissal of the claim against Estrada without prejudice.

Ramirez must respond to the complaint within twenty-one days. The court separately recommended, subject to objections within fourteen days and review by the district judge, that the default judgment motion be denied as moot, without prejudice to a new motion after valid service and a new entry of default.

Key Takeaways

  • A prison litigation coordinator's authority to accept service for the institution does not establish authority to accept service for an individual officer.
  • Once service is challenged, the plaintiff must show compliance with Rule 4, and a diligent but ineffective attempt does not make service valid.
  • A default entered without valid service cannot stand because the duty to respond is never triggered, and a court may set it aside on its own motion.
  • The ruling is not a merits decision or a dismissal: Ramirez must respond, the claim against Estrada survives for now, and the default judgment recommendation awaits action by the district judge.

Why It Matters

The order applies settled Rule 4 principles to a recurring situation in which a pro se prisoner leaves papers with a facility official rather than serving the individual defendant. It is an unpublished magistrate judge order, so it carries at most persuasive weight, and its default judgment portion is only a recommendation until the district judge acts.

Still open are whether Plaintiff can identify and serve Estrada within sixty days, how the court will rule on any request for identification discovery or Marshals Service help, and whether Ramirez will contest the claims on the merits. The court expressly left undecided the Rule 55(c) equitable factors and Estrada's identity.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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