California Case Summaries

Securities and Exchange Commission v. NAC Foundation, LLC, et al. — Judicial Remarks and Rulings in Parallel Criminal Case Do Not Justify Disqualification in Related SEC Enforcement Action

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Securities and Exchange Commission v. NAC Foundation, LLC, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
Judge
William H. Orrick (Barack Obama, 2013)
Date Decided
2026-11-18
Docket No.
3:20-cv-04188
Status
Unreported
Topics
judicial disqualification, 28 U.S.C. section 144, 28 U.S.C. section 455, extrajudicial source doctrine, related cases, criminal conviction, securities enforcement stay

Background

In June 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action alleging that NAC Foundation, LLC and its founder and CEO, Rowland Marcus Andrade, violated federal securities laws through fraudulent and unregistered offerings of crypto assets. Around the same time, federal prosecutors indicted Andrade for wire fraud and money laundering arising from the identical underlying conduct. In January 2021, Judge Richard G. Seeborg stayed the civil proceedings pending resolution of the criminal case. Additionally, the district court's Executive Committee reassigned two related actions—a forfeiture case involving alleged proceeds and a criminal prosecution charging Jack Abramoff—to Judge Seeborg in the interests of justice and judicial economy.

Following a March 2025 jury trial, Andrade was convicted of wire fraud and money laundering. Judge Seeborg extended the civil stay pending restitution in the criminal case and subsequently granted several additional extensions. On October 2, 2026, shortly before the expiration of the stay, Andrade moved under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 to disqualify Judge Seeborg from continuing to preside over the civil enforcement action. Judge Seeborg referred the recusal motion for reassignment to another judge, and it was assigned to District Judge William H. Orrick for determination.

The Court’s Holding

The district court denied the motion to disqualify, holding as a threshold matter that the motion was untimely because Andrade waited nearly seven months after the final order cited in his motion without showing good cause for the delay. The court noted that Andrade's incarceration and generalized communication difficulties with counsel did not excuse the untimeliness, especially since he actively litigated other post-trial matters during that period.

On the merits, the court held that Andrade failed to satisfy the legal standards for disqualification under §§ 144 and 455. Under the extrajudicial source doctrine, prior judicial rulings, administrative courtroom statements, and evidentiary determinations made during parallel criminal proceedings do not demonstrate personal bias. Judge Seeborg's sentencing remarks and evidentiary rulings concerning co-conspirators reflected normal judicial functions rather than deep-seated antagonism or favoritism toward the government, and overlapping issues between related criminal and civil matters warrant handling by the same judge under local rules rather than recusal.

Key Takeaways

  • A motion for judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 must be brought with reasonable promptness, and unjustified delay warrants denial on procedural grounds alone.
  • Ordinary judicial rulings, evidentiary exclusions, and sentencing commentary delivered during a parallel criminal trial do not satisfy the extrajudicial source doctrine required for recusal.
  • The presence of overlapping factual issues and legal questions between related civil and criminal proceedings is a standard basis for case coordination and assignment, not a valid ground for disqualification.

Why It Matters

This ruling underscores the strict application of timeliness constraints and the extrajudicial source doctrine to recusal motions directed at judges overseeing parallel civil and criminal dockets. It affirms that litigating related proceedings before a single judge promotes judicial economy and that litigants cannot weaponize adverse rulings or ordinary judicial remarks from a criminal trial to shop for a new judge in collateral enforcement actions.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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