Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Ronald William Ward, a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action proceeds on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Batra. On September 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion titled 'Notice and Motion 1. Failure to Following Discovery and Scheduling Order. 2. Rule 37(b) Failure to Comply with a Court Order. 3. Title VII, Judgment Rule 54(c) Demand for Judgment; Relief to Be Granted.' (Doc. 76.)
The motion asked the court to strike 'the 17 filed responses in the Defendant's court records,' though the list attached to the motion identified 19 documents prepared by Defendant or defense counsel, claiming they were unsigned or not executed under penalty of perjury and thus had no evidentiary value. Plaintiff also requested sanctions in the form of a default judgment against Defendant Batra under Rule 37(b)(2)(vi), demanded judgment for $212,000,000.00 plus medical costs, disability value, and legal fees under Rule 54(c), and requested the appointment of counsel if his other requests were denied.
The court noted that the discovery cut-off deadline passed on October 23, 2025, and that a temporary stay was lifted on August 18, 2026, resetting the pre-trial dispositive motion deadline for November 20, 2026. The court declined to construe the motion as a motion to compel further discovery because that deadline expired nearly one year earlier, and it characterized the motion as a repackaging of earlier disagreements into a single motion by another name.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied Plaintiff's request to strike the documents, finding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of the 19 listed documents were improperly signed or not properly executed under penalty of perjury. Many of the documents were oppositions to motions the court had already adjudicated, oppositions need not include supporting declarations, and several were electronically signed, which is permissible. The court also found the challenge to the electronic signatures untimely under Local Rule 131(d), which requires objections to be filed within 21 days of receiving the Notice of Electronic Filing.
On the Rule 37 request, the court applied the five-factor test from Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles. The first two factors — the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the court's need to manage its docket — weigh against entering default for Plaintiff and against Defendant Batra, because discovery has concluded and the case is primed for dispositive motion practice. The risk of prejudice to Defendant Batra also weighs against default because the record shows Defendant engaged in discovery and Plaintiff showed no ignored obligations; the public policy favoring disposition on the merits weighs against default; and less drastic sanctions are available. The court found no sanctionable or disobedient conduct and declined to render default judgment against Defendant Batra.
The court also denied the request for appointment of counsel, finding no exceptional circumstances. There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in § 1983 actions, and the court found it premature to assess the likelihood of success on the merits while dispositive motion practice remains. Plaintiff demonstrated an ability to articulate his claims pro se through numerous filings over five years, and the Eighth Amendment claim is not complex. Circumstances common to most prisoners or civil detainees, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances.
Key Takeaways
- A party challenging the authenticity of an electronically-filed document must file objections within 21 days of receiving the Notice of Electronic Filing under Local Rule 131(d).
- Rule 37 default judgment is an extreme sanction disfavored when discovery has concluded and the case is ready for dispositive motion practice, and all five Thompson factors weighed against default here.
- Pro se litigants do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in § 1983 actions, and counsel is sought only in exceptional circumstances.
- The ability to file numerous motions and documents over several years demonstrates a pro se litigant's ability to articulate claims, weighing against the appointment of counsel.
- Repackaging previous disagreements into a new motion does not provide a legitimate basis for striking documents or obtaining sanctions, and a motion to compel cannot be revived after the discovery deadline has long expired.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces the strict procedural requirements for challenging electronically filed documents and the high bar for obtaining Rule 37 sanctions, particularly default judgment. It also illustrates the standard for appointing counsel for pro se civil detainees, emphasizing that the difficulties inherent in pro se litigation do not automatically constitute exceptional circumstances.
The decision highlights the court's reluctance to entertain motions that attempt to relitigate prior disputes under new labels, particularly when discovery has closed and the case is moving toward summary judgment or trial.