Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rodriguez v. Google LLC is a certified class action in the Northern District of California that resulted in a jury verdict and a judgment. Google has appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the order states that no payments have been made. The opt-out deadline passed in early 2025; the order gives it as February 20, 2025 in one place and refers to March 2025 in another. On June 30, 2026, absent class member Michael Mayes moved under Rules 60(b)(1) and 6(b)(1)(B) for relief from the judgment and an enlargement of the opt-out period, in effect seeking late exclusion so he could preserve the right to bring his own individual suit.
The court denied that motion on August 20, 2026, along with several others, reasoning that the deadline had expired about 14 months earlier and that Mayes had not shown the class notice was inadequate under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) or the Due Process Clause. Mayes sought reconsideration, arguing that adequate notice does not end the inquiry and that late exclusion is governed by the discretionary excusable-neglect standard of Silber v. Mabon. He said he first learned of the lawsuit from a June 20, 2026 email about class counsel's fee application. That email indicated he had been notified by email in fall 2024, but he says he does not remember it.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted reconsideration under Rule 59, agreeing that Mayes was entitled to analysis under the Silber factors and that his Rule 60(b) motion was timely because it was filed within one year of judgment. It observed that Rule 6(b) relief may no longer be available after final judgment, since Mayes's cited cases involved opt-out requests made before judgment or final approval, but it did not decide the point and assumed relief was available. It then denied both the Rule 60(b) and Rule 6(b)(1)(B) motions because Mayes had not shown excusable neglect.
On notice, the court found a high degree of compliance with best practicable procedures, including direct emails to more than 341 million affected accounts, a media plan with digital and social components, and sponsored search listings. Failing to read an email, it held, cannot justify relief from an opt-out deadline: once the email was delivered the notice administrator could do nothing more, and how Mayes managed his inbox was within his control. The delay was therefore his responsibility. He acted quickly and in good faith after June 2026, but speed is measured from receipt of notice, which the court treated as 2024. Two points favored him: he seeks exclusion only for himself, and this was a jury verdict rather than a bargained settlement.
Those points were outweighed by finality risks and prejudice to Google. Mayes wants to pursue individual claims that Google had reason to treat as part of the class action. Granting his request could encourage others to seek exclusion because they dislike the verdict or the fee award. A post-judgment opt-out also lets members decide whether to be bound after learning the outcome, raising one-way intervention concerns. The pending appeal heightens the risk, because members could watch the appeal and opt out if it looks unfavorable. The court granted reconsideration and denied the underlying motions.
Key Takeaways
- Late-exclusion requests are judged under the Pioneer and Silber excusable-neglect factors, even when the court has already found the class notice adequate.
- A class member's failure to read or remember a delivered notice email is within the member's control and does not by itself excuse a missed opt-out deadline.
- Prompt action and good faith after a class member learns of the case do not suffice when the delay since adequate notice was long and attributable to the movant.
- Requests made after final judgment carry heightened finality and prejudice concerns, including one-way intervention, and a pending appeal can increase them.
- The court assumed without deciding that Rule 6(b) can reach post-judgment opt-out requests, so that question remains open.
Why It Matters
The order shows that a court may revisit a denial and apply the fuller Silber analysis yet reach the same result. The court reasoned that notice adequacy turns on the reasonableness of the notice plan rather than on whether each member actually read it, and that opt-out requests made after a verdict and during an appeal draw particular scrutiny.
The ruling is limited to one absent member's late-exclusion request in a jury-verdict class action. It does not address the merits of the class judgment, which remains on appeal, and it does not decide whether Rule 6(b) allows post-judgment enlargement of an opt-out period. As a single district court's discretionary ruling, it carries no precedential weight beyond its persuasive reasoning.