Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Qudratullah Tanai, proceeding without counsel, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 23, 2026, challenging his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He also sought in forma pauperis status, a temporary restraining order, and appointed counsel. The court later construed the petition as including a temporary-restraining-order motion, set a briefing schedule, and asked the government to identify any distinction from prior decisions and to state any opposition to a merits ruling on the existing briefing.
The government opposed relief on the ground that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) required detention because Tanai originally had been released on parole. It nevertheless conceded that the case fit the category in which the court had treated prior parole as more significant than the manner of entry, and it did not oppose a direct merits decision. The court found that Tanai was paroled into the United States under Operation Allies Refuge around October 15, 2021; his parole remained active through October 14, 2025, and he stayed afterward. Around April 15, 2026, he was transferred from local custody to ICE custody under an I-200 warrant, with no indication of advance notice or a pre-deprivation hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the government's mandatory-detention argument, explaining that the I-200 warrant undermined reliance on § 1225(b)(2) because that warrant relies on the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. It incorporated its reasoning in Frantzcy v. Chestnut: a person previously paroled into the United States acquired a liberty interest in that release, and the government violated due process by re-detaining him without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing. The court therefore concluded that Tanai's re-detention was unconstitutional and ordered his immediate release, also citing Khosti v. Blanche as supporting release of a previously paroled OAR participant in similar circumstances.
The operative judgment required release under the same conditions, if any, that applied before the April 2026 re-detention. It separately enjoined and restrained the government from re-detaining Tanai for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge. At that hearing, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Tanai is either a danger or a flight risk. The court granted in forma pauperis status, denied the temporary-restraining-order and counsel motions as moot, directed service on the detention facility, and ordered judgment for Tanai and closure of the case.
Key Takeaways
- Prior parole was central to the court's conclusion that Tanai had a liberty interest in his release, notwithstanding the government's reliance on his parole status to assert mandatory detention.
- The I-200 warrant mattered because the court treated it as relying on § 1226, undermining the government's claim that § 1225(b)(2) authorized the detention.
- The remedy was immediate release on the prior conditions, if any, rather than merely an order requiring additional immigration proceedings before release.
- Any future re-detention, absent exigent circumstances, requires notice and an immigration-judge hearing at which the government bears a clear-and-convincing burden on danger or flight risk.
- The temporary-restraining-order and appointed-counsel requests were denied only because the habeas grant made them moot, while the court separately warned government counsel that repeating the rejected parole distinction could lead to a show-cause order concerning sanctions.
Why It Matters
The decision applies procedural due process to immigration re-detention by distinguishing a person already released on parole from the government's asserted mandatory-detention framework. Its remedy specifies both immediate release and safeguards against repeating the same deprivation, including allocation of a heightened burden to the government at any required future hearing.
A separate footnote addresses advocacy rather than the merits. The court said it had previously directed respondent's counsel to read its orders and cited authorities before repeating the assertion that prior parole distinguished the relevant cases. It urged counsel to refrain from doing so again and warned that continued repetition wastes judicial resources and could leave no choice but to issue an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed; this order itself did not impose sanctions or issue that show-cause order.