Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Charles Tooker was convicted in 2018 of attempted murder, criminal threats, assault offenses, corporal injury on a former dating partner, and a misdemeanor court-order violation. He received a 16-year prison sentence that included upper terms for attempted murder and a great-bodily-injury enhancement. This was the fifth appellate opinion in his case. Earlier proceedings addressed mental health diversion and legislation changing sentencing rules, including Senate Bill 567’s restrictions on imposing upper terms based on aggravating circumstances not stipulated to or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Tooker III, the Court of Appeal had found no resentencing remand necessary despite the trial court’s reliance on four aggravating factors that had not been established in the required manner. After the California Supreme Court decided People v. Lynch and directed reconsideration, Tooker IV reversed the sentence and remanded for “a full resentencing.” On remand, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could try the unproven aggravating factors to a jury. Tooker then admitted particular-victim-vulnerability and planning factors, and the prosecution agreed not to pursue the others. At the October 21, 2025 hearing, the court found three mitigating factors but concluded that aggravation heavily outweighed mitigation and imposed the same sentence, fines, and assessments. Tooker appealed the remittitur ruling and monetary charges and sought correction of his custody credits.
The Court’s Holding
The court reviewed the remittitur’s meaning de novo. Although its terms define the trial court’s jurisdiction, the court explained that a disposition need not enumerate every matter covered and must be interpreted together with the accompanying opinion. It rejected Tooker’s argument that “a full resentencing” necessarily excluded a jury trial on aggravating factors. People v. Dorado was distinguishable because there the prosecution had already elected not to seek such a trial, whereas no jury opportunity had occurred when Tooker IV was decided. Tooker IV also remanded under Lynch, which contemplated further litigation and a possible jury trial on aggravating circumstances. Because the remittitur neither expressly nor implicitly prohibited that procedure, the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction, and the related due-process claim failed.
The court declined the Attorney General’s concession concerning the assessments and held the ability-to-pay challenge forfeited. Tooker II had expressly allowed Tooker to raise that claim on an earlier remand, but he did not do so. He also failed to object when the amended probation report recommended the same monetary charges before resentencing. The court rejected his futility argument based on the later decision in People v. Kopp: existing authority already supported objections based on excessive fines or inability to pay, and Kopp did not create a new or expanded basis for relief. Finally, the court agreed that Item 16 of the abstract omitted credits awarded at resentencing. It ordered that item corrected to show 3,233 actual-credit days, 71 local conduct-credit days, and 3,304 total days. The judgment was affirmed, with directions to amend the abstract and send a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Key Takeaways
- A remand for a full resentencing under Lynch does not, without restrictive language, bar a jury trial on previously unproven aggravating factors.
- The scope of a remittitur is determined from both its disposition and the appellate opinion, rather than from an assumption that every authorized step must be expressly listed.
- A defendant can forfeit an ability-to-pay challenge by failing to use an earlier expressly authorized opportunity and by not objecting at the later sentencing.
- The later clarification in Kopp did not make an earlier objection futile because existing law already supplied grounds to challenge criminal monetary obligations.
- The only correction ordered concerned Item 16 of the abstract of judgment, which needed to include all custody credits awarded through resentencing.
Why It Matters
The decision applies remittitur principles to the sentencing procedure contemplated by Lynch, distinguishing a full resentencing from a remand expressly confined to the existing record. It also treats a party’s earlier election not to seek a jury trial as important when assessing whether such a trial would disturb the status quo.
The forfeiture ruling underscores that a general change or clarification in the law does not necessarily excuse silence at sentencing. The court’s refusal to accept the prosecution’s concession also shows that forfeiture remained an independent basis for rejecting the monetary-charge claim. The custody-credit correction was administrative and did not alter the affirmed prison sentence.