Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A jury convicted Avery Stancil of intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)), and the trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life in prison. At trial, the victim, Jane Doe, testified, and the court permitted counsel to read the preliminary hearing testimony of Anne Doe, the victim in a 2005 case in which Stancil had pleaded no contest to sexual battery. Stancil testified in his own defense, denying both the charged crime and the prior offense against Anne Doe.
On appeal, Stancil raised three claims of error. First, he argued the trial court wrongly denied his objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Ms. Wilson-Rosa, a 66-year-old Black prospective alternate juror. Second, he contended the trial court erred in declaring Anne Doe unavailable and admitting her preliminary hearing testimony, violating his confrontation and due process rights. Third, he asserted the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to qualify Daniel Olmos, a criminal defense attorney, as an expert to testify about studies showing innocent people sometimes plead guilty.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. On the peremptory challenge, the court applied section 231.7, under which appellate courts must give 'scrupulous consideration' to the records before them to determine whether an objectively reasonable person would view race as a factor in the strike. The prosecutor's primary reason was that Ms. Wilson-Rosa was the only prospective juror who did not understand why a prior allegation or conviction for sexual assault would be relevant in a case involving sexual assault particularly on a child. The court held this reason valid and not presumptively invalid under subdivisions (e)(13) or (g)(1), because it rested on her statements rather than her demeanor and was not similarly applicable to unchallenged jurors; substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the jurors referenced by Stancil were distinguishable.
On the unavailable-witness issue, the court held the trial court did not err in finding Anne Doe unavailable under Evidence Code section 240. The trial court spoke with her in chambers, observed firsthand her adamancy about not wanting to be in the same room with Stancil, and personally observed her stress and ongoing trauma, concluding further efforts would not be fruitful. Citing People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581 and People v. Lawson (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1121, the court held the trial court need not have threatened criminal contempt or a fine—extreme measures that would have been a symbolic gesture without practical impact, particularly given section 1219's bar on imprisoning sexual assault victims who refuse to testify.
On expert testimony, the court found no error under Evidence Code section 720. Olmos was permitted to testify about plea bargaining from his experience, including that some clients plead guilty while denying the allegations, but the trial court properly declined to qualify him as an expert to discuss studies he had read but not conducted, since he was not a sociologist or scientist and had never testified as an expert. The court could not say that ruling was so irrational or arbitrary that no person could reasonably agree with it.
Key Takeaways
- Under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a prosecutor's concern that a prospective juror does not understand the relevance of prior-offense evidence can be a valid, race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge even when the juror is Black.
- A denial of a section 231.7 objection is reviewed de novo, with the trial court's express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence, and the appellate court may not impute findings the trial court did not expressly state on the record.
- Even if one stated reason is presumptively invalid, the court must still weigh all other reasons and relevant circumstances in the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.
- A trial court need not threaten a sexual assault victim with contempt or fines before finding her unavailable when the record shows such efforts would be futile.
- A lawyer with practical plea-bargaining experience may testify about that experience, but a court acts within its discretion in refusing to qualify him as an expert on studies he merely read.
Why It Matters
The opinion applies in detail California's statutory framework in Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, enacted by the Legislature in 2020 because the traditional Batson/Wheeler framework was thought inadequate to identify and curb improper discrimination in jury selection. It illustrates how courts evaluate whether stated reasons are presumptively invalid under subdivisions (e)(13) and (g)(1) and how to conduct the required totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.
The decision also confirms that trial courts have flexibility in finding sexual assault victims unavailable without resorting to contempt threats, and it underscores the broad discretion courts have in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, particularly when the proposed expert's knowledge comes from reading studies rather than conducting research.