Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A San Francisco jury convicted Gary Owens of the second-degree murder of Ronisha Cook, attempted murder of Jamal Raheem, assault with a firearm, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and unlawful firearm possession, together with firearm allegations. The prosecution’s evidence included surveillance footage and evidence that the Audi carrying Cook and Raheem was struck by nine bullets; Owens disputed that the blurry footage showed him firing a gun. His employer, Raymond Davis, testified that Owens had passed through venue security while working earlier that evening. The jury initially split six-to-six on first-degree murder and premeditation, which the prosecutor withdrew, before returning the second-degree murder verdict.
After trial, Owens alleged that Juror No. 7 had concealed during voir dire that his biological mother, like Cook, died from gun violence and had spoken outside court with Davis during deliberations. Davis described a lengthy bar conversation about the case, while the juror gave a narrower account. The trial court credited important parts of the juror’s timeline, assumed misconduct from the outside contact, and expressly found misconduct in the nondisclosure. It nevertheless denied a new trial after finding no substantial likelihood of actual bias. Owens received a sentence described in the opinion as 28 years to life and appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed that both forms of misconduct occurred. It deferred to the supported findings that Davis initiated the brief in-trial contact and that no detailed case discussion occurred then, so that contact was not shown to be intentional. But the court independently concluded that the voir dire concealment was intentional: a biological mother was plainly a relative, the juror never claimed confusion or forgetfulness, and he acknowledged avoiding disclosure that could have led to his removal. His later choice not to report the contacts after recognizing Davis also informed the prejudice analysis.
Misconduct presumed prejudice, and the court held that the prosecution failed to establish no substantial likelihood of actual bias. The juror twice withheld material information to preserve his service or avoid disrupting deliberations; the concealed family shooting closely paralleled Cook’s death; and he connected the two deaths while speaking with Davis. His admitted unease after contact with Owens’s only witness added concern. His assurances of impartiality were insufficient, and Evidence Code section 1150 barred consideration of his statements about how the misconduct affected his verdicts. Because this was not an extraneous-information case under the trial court’s findings, strong evidence of guilt did not defeat relief. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Although reversal mooted Owens’s other claims, the court addressed issues that could recur. It agreed that the trial court should have struck, rather than stayed, the Penal Code section 12022.53(d) enhancement when imposing the lesser included subdivision (b) enhancement. It also agreed that the abstract incorrectly described attempted first-degree murder: attempted murder has no degrees, and the prosecution had withdrawn the premeditation allegation. The formal disposition reversed the order denying a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- Intentional concealment during voir dire strongly supports the presumption of prejudice, particularly when a juror withholds information to avoid being removed from the jury.
- A juror’s sincere belief in personal impartiality does not necessarily rebut that presumption, and section 1150 excludes testimony about the misconduct’s effect on the verdict.
- The close parallel between the juror’s mother’s shooting death and Cook’s killing, combined with the unreported encounter with Owens’s only witness, left a substantial likelihood of actual bias.
- The appellate court deferred to supported historical findings about the bar contacts but independently decided prejudice and ordered a new trial.
- The court also identified the enhancement-striking and abstract-of-judgment corrections for any further proceedings, while its express disposition reversed the new-trial denial.
Why It Matters
The decision separates credibility and historical-fact findings, which receive deference, from the appellate court’s independent responsibility to assess prejudice from juror misconduct. It emphasizes that brevity or lack of intent in an outside contact does not erase the combined significance of deliberate concealment, a closely analogous family experience, and a juror’s decision to withhold later information from the court.
The ruling also prevents the strength of the prosecution’s case from substituting for an impartial adjudicator in these circumstances. Its additional sentencing discussion distinguishes striking an enhancement from staying it and clarifies that a withdrawn premeditation allegation cannot support labeling the conviction attempted first-degree murder.