Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Charles Westley Mason appealed from judgments in two Los Angeles County cases. In MA069753, the People charged him with first-degree burglary with a person present occurring on September 22, 2016, and alleged a strike prior and a prior serious felony conviction. On January 10, 2017, Mason pled no contest to the residential burglary and admitted the residence was occupied; the court granted felony probation and released him from custody, and the People dismissed the strike prior allegation. On April 10, 2017, probation was revoked and a bench warrant issued; Mason appeared in court in custody on April 11, 2017, and on September 8, 2023, the court found a probation violation and terminated probation.
In MA070965, the People charged Mason with attempted murder, escape, assault with a deadly weapon, rape, and criminal threats arising from three incidents on April 7 and 8, 2017, and alleged strike priors, conduct enhancements, and six aggravating factors. Mason pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of the other charges, found the deadly weapon and great bodily injury enhancements not true, and outside the jury's presence he admitted his prior attempted residential burglary and residential burglary convictions. At the sanity phase, the jury found him sane for the rape and escape offenses but could not decide sanity for the assault and criminal threats offenses, and the defense did not seek a retrial. At sentencing, the court denied his request to dismiss strike priors, imposed 25 years to life for rape, imposed the assault and criminal threats terms concurrent to each other but consecutive to the rape term, selected and doubled the middle term for escape for a consecutive four-year term, added five years for one section 667(a) enhancement while dismissing the other, and issued protective orders for the rape victim and for John Ojo.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal addressed three contentions. First, it rejected Mason's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the middle term for the escape conviction. Under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the lower-term presumption is triggered only by an initial showing that psychological or childhood trauma contributed to the offense. The sanity-phase record showed mental health disorders and trauma, but it was silent as to whether Mason's mental illness history resulted in psychological trauma or whether trauma contributed to the escape offense, and the court was not required to fill those gaps. Because the presumption was not triggered, the court did not need to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court also rejected the alternative ineffective-assistance claim: the claim was forfeited because Mason did not seek the lower term, object to the middle term, or argue that trauma contributed to the escape, and his prejudice showing was conclusory and speculative.
Second, the court accepted the Attorney General's concession that the post-sentencing criminal protective order for John Ojo was unauthorized because Mason's convictions for the offenses against Ojo are not among the offenses for which the statute authorizes such an order, and it ordered that order vacated. Third, the court accepted the concession that the MA069753 sentence was erroneously doubled based on a strike prior allegation the prosecutor had dismissed. The court vacated that sentence, directed correction of the abstract of judgment to one year four months, directed preparation of a corrected abstract and forwarding of a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant must make an initial showing that psychological or childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the specific offense to trigger the lower-term presumption under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).
- A forfeited sentencing claim cannot become cognizable on appeal merely by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, and a prejudice showing based on speculation is insufficient.
- Post-conviction criminal protective orders are authorized only for the offenses specified by statute.
- A trial court cannot double a sentence based on a strike prior allegation that the prosecution dismissed.
- The Court of Appeal may accept Attorney General concessions where the record supports the defendant's contentions, while still independently reviewing the remaining sentencing issue.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the importance of preserving sentencing claims in the trial court and building a record that connects trauma to the offense; evidence of mental illness from a sanity phase does not by itself satisfy section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).
It also reinforces statutory limits on post-conviction protective orders and the Three Strikes law: a dismissed strike prior cannot support doubling, and the appellate court corrected those errors while otherwise leaving the convictions and sentence intact.