Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A jury convicted Darrick Demond Hicks of three counts of resisting an executive officer under Penal Code section 69 and a misdemeanor count of being under the influence of a controlled substance under Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). The trial court imposed three years of formal probation for the felony counts and a time-served jail sentence for the misdemeanor. It also ordered per-count court operations and court facilities assessments, a $150 drug program fee, and a $300 restitution fine.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a September 24, 2019 opinion, rejecting Hicks’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments and his due process challenge to the financial obligations. The California Supreme Court granted review and, on June 10, 2026, transferred the case with directions to vacate the prior decision and reconsider it in light of People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1. After supplemental briefing and oral argument, the court issued this opinion on remand.
The underlying incident began in November 2017 when Los Angeles Sheriff’s Deputies Christopher Morris and Bryan Wiggins responded to a Palmdale apartment after a report that Hicks refused to leave and had fallen asleep on a sofa. Wiggins observed rapid speech, profuse sweating, jaw clenching, a resting pulse of 132 beats per minute, and dilated pupils. Hicks agreed to field sobriety tests and initially complied with handcuffing, but then stopped walking, tensed his body, pushed backward and sideways, kicked, and ignored orders to calm down. One kick struck Morris’s arm, and additional officers and firefighters helped restrain and remove Hicks.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that substantial evidence supported all three resisting convictions. Hicks’s flailing and kicking while disobeying repeated orders supplied evidence of forceful resistance; the uniformed deputies’ presence and explanation for being there supported his knowledge that they were officers; and their response to the 911 call supported lawful performance of duty. His initial cooperation did not negate the general-intent requirement or immunize later resistance. The court also rejected the “helpless flailing” argument because the deputies turned him onto his side so he could breathe and because forceful resistance can violate section 69 without proof that force was directed toward an officer. Cases involving more aggressive conduct did not establish an additional prerequisite to conviction.
Substantial evidence likewise supported the controlled-substance conviction. Wiggins and a responding paramedic relied on their training and experience and on Hicks’s dilated pupils, elevated pulse, sweating, jaw clenching, and inability to remain still. The prosecution did not have to identify methamphetamine through a chemical test, and decisions concerning driving under the influence were inapposite because that offense additionally requires impairment of physical or mental ability.
Exercising discretion to reach the payment issues despite the absence of a sentencing objection, the court applied Kopp. It vacated the portion of the judgment imposing court-ordered payments and remanded so Hicks could challenge a fine as constitutionally excessive or raise another Kopp-compatible challenge. If requested, the trial court must consider inability to pay before imposing the operations or facilities assessments, and it must consider ability to pay before imposing the drug program fee. The appellate court expressed no opinion on the merits of those challenges and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Key Takeaways
- Initial cooperation with officers does not prevent a later forceful resistance from supporting a Penal Code section 69 conviction.
- A resisting conviction does not require proof that the defendant directed force toward a particular officer or engaged in deliberately aggressive behavior as an independent element.
- Observable drug-use symptoms and trained witness conclusions can support a conviction for being under the influence without a blood, urine, or breath test.
- On remand, Hicks may pursue an excessive-fines challenge, while inability-to-pay consideration of the two assessments depends on his request.
- The drug program fee requires the trial court to consider ability to pay as mandated by statute.
Why It Matters
The opinion separates the affirmed criminal convictions from the unresolved financial obligations. It does not itself decide that the $300 restitution fine is excessive or that Hicks cannot pay any assessment or fee; those questions remain for the trial court under Kopp.
The disposition also vacates the court’s September 24, 2019 opinion. The remand therefore concerns further sentencing proceedings on court-ordered payments, not a retrial or reconsideration of the affirmed convictions.