Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In 2017, a Sonoma County jury convicted Darius Bunyad, a chiropractor, of six counts of felony sexual battery by fraud, one count of misdemeanor battery, and six misdemeanor counts of annoying or molesting a child; his victims were patients and employees, many of them minors. In June 2022 the trial court sentenced him to a 10-year prison term, required sex-offender registration, and awarded 548 days each of actual and conduct credit. The Court of Appeal affirmed on direct appeal in an unpublished May 14, 2024 decision.
Bunyad remained in local custody after sentencing while awaiting trial in another Sonoma County case rather than being transferred to state prison. On February 18, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on his custody status and credits. When Bunyad asked to represent himself at the purported 'resentencing,' the court made clear he was not being resentenced and offered two options: update his credits for immediate release, or leave the credits unchanged and transfer him to state prison for processing and eventual release. Bunyad expressly preferred the credit adjustment and release. The court awarded 3,652 total days of credit (1,826 actual and 1,826 conduct), issued an amended abstract retaining the same 10-year sentence, and ordered him to report to 'Parole' within one day of release.
Bunyad appealed under Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b). His appointed appellate counsel filed a no-issue brief requesting Wende review, but because this was an appeal from a postjudgment order rather than a first appeal from a conviction, the court held under People v. Delgadillo that it need not independently search the record; it instead evaluated the three arguments in Bunyad's supplemental brief. The court also denied his judicial-notice requests for lack of relevance and denied augmentation relief as untimely and improper.
The Court’s Holding
The court first held that the February 18, 2025 order did not modify Bunyad's sentence: the amended abstract changed only the credit calculation and substituted release on a paper commitment for transfer to the Department, retaining the identical 10-year term. Although section 2900.5 assigns calculation of postsentence custody days to the receiving agency rather than the sentencing court, Bunyad was not aggrieved by avoiding prison transfer and gaining immediate release, and his express agreement to the credit award barred the challenge under the invited-error doctrine. The court concluded any error was invited and/or harmless.
The court next upheld the parole-reporting directive. Parole had been mentioned repeatedly at the 2022 sentencing, and a state-prison sentence carries mandatory parole or postrelease community supervision (PRCS) unless waived; the sentencing court had no discretion to impose imprisonment without one. Parole can apply to a person whose sentence has been deemed served under section 2900.5 for a crime for which the person is classified as a high-risk sex offender, a term the Legislature has not defined. Even assuming that classification did not apply, section 3000.08, subdivision (l), required him to remain on parole after 60 days of supervision despite a later determination favoring PRCS; he first raised the issue on appeal, more than a year after release.
Finally, the court rejected the no-counsel claim. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel at critical stages does not extend unconditionally beyond conviction and direct appeal, and Bunyad cited no applicable statutory right. The record showed a deputy public defender—who represented him in the other SCR-684956-1 case—appeared at the hearing, and he showed no prejudicial error. The court affirmed the postjudgment order; a related habeas petition (A175633) was addressed by separate order.
Key Takeaways
- An appeal from a postjudgment order does not trigger the independent record review required for a first appeal as of right from a conviction.
- A defendant who expressly agrees to a trial court's custody-credit procedure may be barred from challenging it on appeal under the invited-error doctrine.
- A state-prison sentence includes mandatory parole or PRCS unless waived, even if the sentencing judge does not orally announce supervision.
- Under section 3000.08, subdivision (l), a person may have to remain on parole after 60 days of supervision despite a later determination that PRCS would have been appropriate.
- The no-counsel claim failed both because no continuing right was established and because a deputy public defender appeared at the hearing.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Delgadillo's distinction between a first appeal from a conviction and an appeal from a postjudgment order while still issuing a written evaluation of the defendant's supplemental arguments. It shows how invited error and lack of prejudice can defeat a challenge to a credit procedure that produced immediate release without altering the prison term.
The opinion separates the legality of a parole directive from whether parole was orally announced at sentencing, and emphasizes the 60-day statutory limit on shifting from parole to county supervision. The related habeas petition (A175633) was decided separately, and the court denied judicial notice of records from the other pending case.