Reported / Citable
Background
Stuart Stammers was convicted of forcible digital penetration after a disputed sexual encounter. At trial, prosecutors introduced numerous crude, racist, and sexually demeaning messages he had sent to friends in the preceding months, although many did not concern the complaining witness or the alleged act.
The prosecution returned to those communications throughout the case, using them to portray Stammers as someone who objectified Asian women. He argued on appeal that the material functioned as forbidden character evidence and overwhelmed the jury’s assessment of the charged encounter.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth District reversed. Much of the messaging evidence had little or no probative connection to the disputed issues, while carrying an obvious risk that jurors would punish Stammers for offensive beliefs or infer a propensity to commit sexual violence. Its admission was erroneous under ordinary relevance and Evidence Code section 352 principles.
The error rose to a due-process violation because of the volume and inflammatory nature of the exhibits and the prosecutor’s excessive emphasis on them. The court could not find the constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so it remanded for a possible retrial.
Key Takeaways
- Offensive private speech is not automatically admissible merely because it reflects badly on a criminal defendant.
- Courts must tie electronic communications to a genuinely disputed issue and weigh their inflammatory effect.
- Prosecutorial emphasis can magnify an evidentiary error into a denial of due process.
- Evidence Code section 352.2 reflects similar concerns about using creative expression as propensity evidence, even though the court decided this case under traditional rules.
Why It Matters
Trial lawyers should challenge large message collections item by item rather than allow their general offensiveness to stand in for relevance. A limiting instruction may not cure a case built around inflammatory material with only a weak link to the charged conduct.
The decision also cautions prosecutors to distinguish evidence proving motive, intent, or credibility from material that principally invites moral condemnation.