Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Pedro Resdendiz Resendiz, a citizen of Mexico, is in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). He first entered the United States in May 2017, received an expedited removal order, and was removed to Mexico shortly after. He was removed two more times that same month under a reinstatement of his prior removal order. He re-entered the United States in 2019 and was arrested several times with serious charges between 2020 and 2023. On October 14, 2025, immigration officials detained him while he was attempting to board a flight, and ICE reinstated his 2017 removal order the same day.
Resendiz filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, seeking relief from removal based on claims that he was subject to torture in Mexico. He argued that his detention was premised on a faulty removal order and that his procedural due process rights were violated because the government failed to follow regulations governing expedited removal. Specifically, he alleged that he never signed the form acknowledging receipt of his Form I-860 and that there was no evidence an officer read him information contained on Form I-867A. He also argued in the alternative that his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) was indefinite and therefore unconstitutional under Zadvydas v. Davis.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Resendiz's challenges to his expedited removal order. Congress has sharply limited judicial review of expedited removal, and federal courts generally cannot review the application of the expedited removal statute to individual noncitizens. The statute permits habeas review only to determine whether the petitioner is a noncitizen, whether the petitioner was ordered removed under the expedited removal statute, and whether the petitioner can prove lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee status. The court found that Resendiz's claims about procedural deficiencies in the expedited removal process did not fall within any of these three narrow categories, citing Ninth Circuit precedent holding that materially identical arguments are not reviewable.
The court also rejected Resendiz's alternative argument that his detention was indefinite and unconstitutional under Zadvydas v. Davis. Zadvydas limits post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about removal, with a presumptive ceiling of six months. After six months, a detainee is entitled to release if they provide good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and the government fails to rebut that showing. The court found that Resendiz had not met this burden because he relied solely on the existence of his pending withholding-only proceedings and a likely appeal to argue his detention was indefinite. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held that pending judicial review alone does not render detention indefinite. The government, by contrast, pointed to several factors indicating removal was reasonably foreseeable, including that Mexico accepts his repatriation and his travel documents are available.
The court concluded that Resendiz had not shown a valid basis for habeas relief and denied the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, directing the clerk to close the file.
Key Takeaways
- Federal courts have extremely limited jurisdiction to review expedited removal orders, confined to three specific statutory determinations about identity, the existence of the order, and the petitioner's immigration status.
- Procedural challenges to the adequacy of the expedited removal process, such as missing signatures or unread forms, fall outside the scope of permissible habeas review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e).
- A detainee cannot establish that detention is indefinite under Zadvydas merely by pointing to pending withholding-only proceedings or a likely appeal; the Ninth Circuit has held that normal judicial review does not create the kind of removable-but-unremovable limbo that Zadvydas found constitutionally problematic.
- Evidence that the destination country accepts repatriation and that travel documents are available supports a finding that removal is reasonably foreseeable, defeating a claim of indefinite detention.
- Even a colorable constitutional claim does not create an exception to the statutory jurisdictional limits on reviewing expedited removal orders, following Supreme Court precedent.
Why It Matters
This decision applies the broad statutory bar on judicial review of expedited removal orders, confirming that claims of procedural irregularities in the removal process are beyond the reach of federal habeas courts. It underscores the narrow scope of the three reviewable categories under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) and the Ninth Circuit's consistent application of those limits.
The ruling also applies the Zadvydas framework to a detainee pursuing withholding-only relief. Simply being detained for more than six months while pursuing such relief or an appeal is not enough to show that removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Detainees must point to concrete factors, such as problems with travel documents or unusual procedural delays, to meet their burden, and the government's showing that repatriation is routine and feasible will typically defeat the claim.