California Case Summaries

Orlonzo Hedrington v. United States of America — Court Denies Post-Remand Motions to Consolidate, Vacate Vexatious Litigant Order, and Demand Jury Trial in FTCA Medical Negligence Case

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Orlonzo Hedrington v. United States of America
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Sean C. Riordan (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, by Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller, 2024)
Date Decided
2026-10-21
Docket No.
2:18-cv-02333
Status
Unreported
Topics
Federal Tort Claims Act, medical negligence, res ipsa loquitur, jury trial, consolidation, vexatious litigant, discovery, case management

Background

This matter returns to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiff Orlonzo Hedrington, proceeding pro se, alleges a single claim of medical negligence against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) arising from events in 2016. The Ninth Circuit previously reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States, finding that Hedrington's evidence raised a triable issue of material fact under a res ipsa loquitur theory. Following remand, the district court held a status conference on October 15, 2026, to address case management and three post-remand motions filed by Hedrington: a motion to consolidate this action with two other cases (2:24-cv-03541 and 2:25-cv-00216), a motion to vacate a vexatious litigant order entered in the 2024 action, and a motion requesting a jury trial.

The 2024 action had been closed with judgment entered on September 17, 2026, while the 2025 action involved multiple additional defendants and six causes of action. The vexatious litigant order at issue was entered on February 25, 2026, by a different judge in the 2024 action and did not appear on the docket in the present case. Hedrington's original complaint, filed while represented by counsel, contained a jury demand; however, the United States denied the right to a jury trial in its answer and maintained that position at the status conference. The government also requested further dispositive motion practice on the res ipsa loquitur issue, while Hedrington indicated a desire to reopen discovery to obtain additional medical records.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied all three of Hedrington's motions. The motion to consolidate was denied because the 2024 action was closed and the 2025 action involved different parties and claims; consolidation would delay the long-pending FTCA case which was ready for trial. The court held it lacked authority to vacate the vexatious litigant order entered in a separate case by a different judge, directing Hedrington to seek relief in that action if desired. The motion for a jury trial was denied as a matter of law: 28 U.S.C. § 2402 provides that actions against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (the FTCA's jurisdictional grant) shall be tried by the court without a jury, except for tax refund suits under § 1346(a)(1). The court cited binding Ninth Circuit precedent holding that a plaintiff cannot opt for a jury trial in an FTCA action, including medical negligence claims involving the Veterans Administration.

Regarding case management, the court declined to set a further dispositive motion deadline, finding the government's request for summary judgment on the res ipsa loquitur issue foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's explicit holding that Hedrington's evidence raised a triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment. The court permitted Hedrington to file a motion to reopen discovery by October 29, 2026, but emphasized that such a motion would require a showing of good cause and diligence under Rule 16(b) and the factors set forth in City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp., including trial imminence, prejudice, diligence, foreseeability, and likelihood of relevant evidence. The court stated it would issue a separate order setting a final pretrial conference and a non-jury trial date before Judge Drozd.

Key Takeaways

  • Jury trials are categorically unavailable in FTCA actions against the United States except for tax refund suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), per 28 U.S.C. § 2402 and binding Ninth Circuit precedent.
  • A district court lacks authority to vacate a vexatious litigant order entered in a separate case by a different judge; relief must be sought in the case where the order was issued.
  • Consolidation under Rule 42 is discretionary and will be denied where it would delay a trial-ready case and the actions involve different parties, claims, or procedural postures (e.g., a closed case).
  • A prior appellate ruling that evidence raises a triable issue of fact under res ipsa loquitur forecloses renewed summary judgment motions on that issue after remand.
  • Motions to reopen discovery after the discovery cutoff and after summary judgment practice require a rigorous showing of good cause and diligence under Rule 16(b) and the City of Pomona factors.

Why It Matters

This order illustrates the procedural posture of an FTCA medical negligence case after a successful appeal from summary judgment. It reinforces the statutory bar on jury trials in FTCA actions, a critical limitation for plaintiffs suing the federal government for medical malpractice. The court's refusal to entertain further dispositive motions on the res ipsa loquitur issue gives effect to the Ninth Circuit's mandate and narrows the path to trial. The decision also underscores the limits of a court's authority to modify orders from related but distinct cases, and the high bar for reopening discovery late in litigation. The case will proceed to a bench trial before Judge Drozd on the sole remaining FTCA negligence claim.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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