Reported / Citable
Background
Bobby Nuanmanee was charged with two misdemeanor DUI counts in Siskiyou County. After he withdrew his statutory time waiver, the prosecution was required to bring him to trial within the timeframe set by Penal Code section 1382—the statute that implements California’s right to a speedy trial. The deadline fell on Monday, December 15, 2025.
On that date, the court heard motions in limine and addressed evidentiary issues. But no jury was summoned, because the Siskiyou County Superior Court had adopted a policy of reserving Mondays for final arguments and other matters, with jury empanelment beginning on Tuesdays. The court justified this scheduling practice by pointing to the public defender’s office’s habit of resolving cases on the day of trial, which the court said “burns jurors” in a county with a small jury pool. Nuanmanee objected and moved to dismiss.
The trial court denied the dismissal motion, finding that trial had effectively “started” on December 15 because “the wheels of trial were set in motion.” Jury selection began the next day but was derailed when the panel was contaminated by a prospective juror’s statements. The trial was reset to January 2026, and Nuanmanee filed an emergency writ petition with the Third District Court of Appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District granted the writ petition and ordered dismissal. Applying the California Supreme Court’s frameworks from Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) and People v. Hajjaj (2010), the court held that Nuanmanee was not “brought to trial” within the meaning of section 1382 on December 15.
Under Rhinehart, a defendant is “brought to trial” only when the court has committed its resources, the parties are ready to proceed, and a panel of prospective jurors has been summoned and sworn. Here, it was impossible to empanel a jury on December 15 because of the court’s own Monday policy. The court rejected the People’s argument that hearing motions in limine demonstrated the court’s readiness, calling the practice of scheduling trial on a day when no jury could be seated “mere lip service to the fundamental right to a speedy trial.”
The court also found no good cause to justify the delay. The scheduling problem was caused by the court’s own administrative policy—not by the defendant’s conduct, unforeseen circumstances, or any other recognized basis for a good cause finding. The court noted that the state has an obligation to resolve routine logistical difficulties in bringing defendants to trial on time.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court cannot satisfy section 1382’s speedy trial requirement merely by conducting pretrial proceedings (motions in limine, evidentiary rulings) on the statutory deadline if no jury is summoned or available.
- Court scheduling policies that systematically prevent jury empanelment on certain days do not constitute “good cause” for delay when the statutory deadline falls on one of those days.
- The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for delay. Delay caused by court congestion or improper court administration does not qualify.
- Defense attorneys in small counties should monitor whether local scheduling practices may create automatic speedy-trial violations and be prepared to file writ petitions promptly.
Why It Matters
This decision sends a clear message to trial courts with scheduling policies that restrict when juries are empaneled: those policies cannot override a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial. The ruling is particularly significant for smaller California counties where limited jury pools and tight schedules may tempt courts to adopt similar Monday-exclusion or other day-of-week restrictions.
For prosecutors, the practical takeaway is to track speedy trial deadlines carefully and, when the deadline falls on a day the local court does not seat juries, move the trial date forward rather than relying on a good-cause argument after the fact. For defense attorneys, the case reaffirms that a prompt writ of mandate—not a post-trial appeal—is the correct vehicle to enforce speedy trial rights in misdemeanor cases.