Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Nicole Tatiana Duran Garcia, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 25, 2026, alleging that immigration authorities violated her due process rights by detaining her again. She sought immediate release. Respondents answered with exhibits on October 7, and Duran Garcia filed a reply with supporting documents on October 19. The Central District of California considered the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which permits challenges to immigration detention sufficiently independent of the merits of a removal order.
Duran Garcia is a citizen and national of Colombia. Immigration officials first encountered and detained her in Tecate, California, on January 26, 2024. She was released the following day on an Order of Release and Recognizance, or ORR, and received a Notice to Appear. Her employment authorization was later approved through July 6, 2030. ICE arrested her on August 18, 2026, one day after the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department arrested her for organized retail theft. That criminal case remained pending, and the court's account of the arrest did not treat the allegation as a conviction.
The ORR required Duran Garcia to comply with conditions, including not violating local, state, or federal laws. ICE had issued a Custody Re-determination/Motion to Recalendar and served a Notice of Custody Determination. Respondents also supplied an arrest warrant reflecting service on August 16. Duran Garcia argued that ICE lacked a valid reason to revoke her release, did not adequately explain the re-arrest, and gave her no opportunity to contest it. Her reply disputed aspects of ICE's description of the arrest, including injuries, but the court stated that she did not challenge the background facts it identified.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge explained that a habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that current custody violates the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties. The order also distinguished habeas relief from a damages action for an unlawful arrest: the central question was not simply whether the arrest was procedurally defective, but whether Duran Garcia was presently entitled to release. The judge therefore evaluated her Fifth Amendment claim using the three-factor framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, while recognizing that due process protections extend to noncitizens present in the United States.
On the first factor, the judge found a cognizable liberty interest arising from Duran Garcia's ORR when she was re-detained after leaving sheriff's custody. On the second, the order emphasized matters she did not dispute: ICE had a warrant, had obtained a custody redetermination or motion to recalendar, and served a custody notice. Her LASD arrest presented a potential ORR violation and changed circumstance. The notice also offered immigration-judge review through a checkbox, but she did not request it and the form reflected that she declined to sign. The judge further noted that she could still request a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), present evidence and arguments with counsel, and appeal an adverse bond decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
On the third factor, the judge acknowledged the government's general interest in enforcing immigration laws and recognized that its interest in detention without a bond hearing may be low. The order nevertheless concluded that the offered and continuing hearing opportunities minimized the risk of erroneous deprivation and that the process provided was sufficient to protect Duran Garcia's liberty interest. She therefore had not shown that due process compelled immediate release. The judge also found that Petitioner had not shown or even alleged any factual basis for an Administrative Procedure Act violation. The order directed that judgment be entered denying the petition with prejudice, while expressly preserving her ability to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
Key Takeaways
- A procedural defect in an immigration arrest does not automatically require habeas release when the petitioner has not shown that present custody is unlawful.
- The magistrate judge recognized a liberty interest associated with release on recognizance but found that the available custody-review procedures satisfied due process in this case.
- The custody notice's option to seek immigration-judge review and the continuing availability of a statutory bond hearing were central to the court's analysis.
- The order directed entry of judgment denying the petition with prejudice, but expressly left Duran Garcia free to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the Mathews balancing framework to immigration re-detention following release on recognizance and focuses on both the process already supplied and the review still available. It treats the dispositive habeas inquiry as present entitlement to release rather than whether every aspect of the original arrest was procedurally sound.
The ruling resolves only Duran Garcia's request for immediate release and her asserted due process and Administrative Procedure Act claims. It does not adjudicate the pending retail-theft case or eliminate administrative custody review; the order specifically preserves her opportunity to seek a bond hearing.