Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Netgear, Inc. sued Choice Electronics Inc. in the Northern District of California. During discovery, Choice noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Netgear's corporate representative, Jesse Kellar, covering numerous topics. At the deposition, Kellar answered 'I don't know' at least 65 times, prompting Choice to file a motion to compel further deposition testimony (Dkt. 109). Choice argued Kellar was 'completely unprepared,' while Netgear contended that Choice had noticed too many deposition topics. Netgear did not object to the topics before the deposition, during meet-and-confer sessions, or through a motion for a protective order.
In connection with the motion, the parties filed a joint statement that included the deposition transcript. Netgear designated the entire transcript as 'highly confidential' under the protective order (Dkt. 53 ¶ 2.7), which defines highly confidential information as trade secrets, prospective marketing plans, financial projections, or other highly sensitive information that could cause direct damages if disclosed. The court reviewed the transcript and the parties' arguments regarding both the adequacy of the 30(b)(6) witness and the propriety of the blanket confidentiality designation.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted Choice's request for additional deposition time, ordering that Choice may depose Kellar for three more hours on or before November 6, 2026. The court found that while Kellar was not 'completely unprepared,' his frequent 'I don't know' answers indicated insufficient preparation for certain topics. The court rejected Netgear's argument that too many topics were noticed, noting that Netgear should have objected before the deposition, during meet-and-confer, or via a protective order motion rather than appearing to choose not to prepare. The parties must meet and confer at least one week before the deposition to narrow the topics to the most important ones Kellar was unprepared to address. Each side bears its own costs, but the court warned it may require Netgear to pay Choice's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, if the witness is again unprepared, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C).
Regarding confidentiality, the court ruled that Netgear's designation of the entire deposition transcript as highly confidential was not warranted. The court specifically found that questions resulting in 'I don't know' answers do not reveal trade secrets, marketing plans, financial projections, or other highly sensitive information as defined by the protective order. Netgear also failed to identify specific prejudice or harm from public disclosure of those portions, as required by Ninth Circuit precedent (Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002)). The court ordered Netgear to propose narrower redactions of the transcript by November 6, 2026, rather than maintaining a blanket seal.
Key Takeaways
- A party cannot avoid Rule 30(b)(6) preparation obligations by failing to object to noticed topics and then sending an unprepared witness; objections must be raised before the deposition or via protective order.
- Courts will grant additional deposition time when a 30(b)(6) witness gives excessive 'I don't know' answers, even if the witness was not 'completely unprepared' overall.
- Blanket 'highly confidential' designations for entire deposition transcripts are disfavored; parties must justify designations with specific prejudice or harm for each portion sealed.
- Questions eliciting 'I don't know' answers generally do not contain trade secrets or sensitive information warranting heightened confidentiality protection.
- Courts may shift costs and attorney's fees under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) if a party produces an unprepared witness for a subsequent deposition.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces the obligation of corporations to adequately prepare Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses and the procedural requirement to timely challenge deposition scope. It illustrates the court's willingness to impose additional depositions and potential fee-shifting as remedies for inadequate preparation. The ruling on confidentiality designations serves as a reminder that protective orders require specific, good-faith justifications for sealing, and that blanket designations—especially for non-substantive testimony—will be rejected. The decision aligns with Ninth Circuit precedent requiring particularized showings of harm to maintain judicial records under seal.