Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Marcel Monji, a pretrial detainee, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Kern County Hospital Authority, the County of Kern, the Kern County Sheriff's Department, and Behavioral Health and Recovery Services, as well as Sheriff Donny Youngblood, Deputy Tyson Davis, and Bill Walker. Monji alleged that he received inadequate medical and mental health care, was improperly placed into administrative segregation, stayed in unsanitary and unhealthy housing conditions, and that the defendants failed to protect him while he was incarcerated in Kern County jail facilities. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
Monji appealed, arguing that the district court incorrectly analyzed his deliberate indifference claims under a subjective standard rather than the objective standard applicable to pretrial detainees. He also argued generally that the district court erred in finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to the County Defendants' liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The Ninth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Bybee and Sung, and District Judge Rita F. Lin of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. The case was submitted without oral argument on October 30, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court held that the district court properly applied the objective deliberate indifference standard required for pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims, as established in Castro v. County of Los Angeles and Gordon v. County of Orange. The district court repeatedly described its application of the 'objective deliberate indifference standard' and cited heavily to Castro and Gordon. Although the district court also cited an Eighth Amendment case describing a 'purposeful act or failure to respond' requirement, the court explained that this language is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment standard requiring an intentional decision regarding conditions of confinement.
The court also held that Monji failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to Monell liability. Monell liability requires evidence of an expressly adopted official policy, a longstanding practice or custom, or action taken or ratified by an official with final policymaking authority. Monji argued that a reasonable jury could infer that the County Defendants maintain unconstitutional customs of understaffing mental health workers, using administrative segregation in a medically indifferent way, and subjecting inmates to unsafe and unsanitary conditions. However, his argument was based on at most two incidents involving only himself, and he failed to show that any other inmates faced similar challenges. The court concluded that these limited and sporadic incidents were insufficient to establish a persistent and widespread custom. Additionally, Monji forfeited any argument that the Individual Defendants were policymakers by not raising it in his opening brief, and he presented no evidence of their personal participation or supervisory liability.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims are evaluated under a purely objective standard, not the subjective standard applicable to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.
- A district court's citation to Eighth Amendment 'purposeful act or failure to respond' language does not constitute misapplication of the standard when the court otherwise correctly applies and describes the objective deliberate indifference standard for Fourteenth Amendment claims.
- Monell liability cannot be established based on isolated incidents involving only the plaintiff; the plaintiff must show a custom or practice that is persistent, widespread, and of sufficient duration to constitute a permanent and well-settled policy.
- Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited, including the argument that individual defendants acted as policymakers for Monell liability purposes.
- Summary judgment is proper for individual defendants when the plaintiff fails to proffer evidence of their personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations or facts supporting supervisory liability.
Why It Matters
This memorandum disposition reinforces the Ninth Circuit's framework for evaluating pretrial detainee conditions-of-confinement claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's objective deliberate indifference standard. It clarifies that references to Eighth Amendment terminology do not invalidate a district court's analysis when the correct objective standard is actually applied. The decision also underscores the high bar for establishing municipal liability under Monell, requiring more than a plaintiff's own isolated experiences to prove a widespread custom or policy.
The ruling serves as a reminder that supervisory liability and policymaker theories require specific evidentiary support and timely briefing. By affirming summary judgment, the court confirmed that a plaintiff cannot rely on sporadic, self-referential incidents to demonstrate a municipal custom, and that arguments not raised in the opening brief will not be considered on appeal.