Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
M.M.R., formerly held in federal immigration detention, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In November 2025, the district court converted a request for a temporary restraining order into a preliminary-injunction motion and ordered a substantive bond hearing. The court granted the petition in June 2026 and entered judgment for M.M.R.
Counsel then sought fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The government asked the court to wait for the Supreme Court’s eventual decision in Montoya Palacios v. Liggins about whether the EAJA’s phrase “any civil action” covers immigration habeas proceedings. Alternatively, it argued that the EAJA did not apply, that its detention position was substantially justified, and that the requested fee should be reduced. The document under review is a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, not a final award.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommended declining a stay. A decision in Palacios could aid the analysis, but judicial economy alone did not outweigh possible prejudice from a delay approaching a year, including interference with M.M.R.’s continued access to counsel. The government identified no comparable hardship from resolving the fee motion now.
On eligibility, the recommendation concluded that an immigration-detention habeas case is a civil action under the EAJA. The Supreme Court has characterized habeas as technically civil, the statute broadly covers any civil action other than tort cases, recent Third and Tenth Circuit decisions agreed, and Ninth Circuit precedent had allowed EAJA fees in some immigration habeas matters. The recommendation therefore rejected the government’s categorical argument.
The government’s position also was not substantially justified. M.M.R. had been paroled, complied with release conditions for nearly three years, and was detained again after voluntarily appearing at ICE’s request. The government did not reconcile its mandatory-detention theory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) with procedural due process, prior release, and the absence of identified flight or danger concerns. The analysis relied on decisions recognizing constitutional limits on detention and treating § 1226 as the applicable discretionary authority for people released into the country and later detained.
For amount, counsel claimed 41.84 attorney hours plus 0.55 paralegal hours. The judge excluded all paralegal time and 1.5 attorney hours spent on filing, compiling, mailing, and other clerical work, leaving 40.34 compensable hours. At the $258.46 EAJA rate, the recommended fee was $10,426.28. It would be payable to M.M.R., or directly to counsel if Treasury finds no federal debt. Objections are due within 14 days after service and ordinarily may not exceed 15 pages without leave and good cause.
Key Takeaways
- The recommendation treats immigration-detention habeas litigation as a civil action eligible for EAJA fees.
- A pending Supreme Court case does not automatically justify staying a fee motion; the proponent must show the balance of prejudice, hardship, and orderly administration favors delay.
- A mandatory-detention argument may lack substantial justification when it fails to address parole, long compliance, and due process protections.
- Filing, document organization, exhibit compilation, and similar clerical tasks are not compensable merely because a lawyer or paralegal performs them.
- The $10,426.28 figure is recommended, not final, unless the district judge adopts the findings and recommendations.
Why It Matters
For California immigration counsel, the recommendation supports seeking EAJA fees after successful detention habeas litigation while Palacios remains unresolved. Applications should document both the underlying lack of substantial justification and each professional task. Detailed time records helped establish reasonableness here, but clerical entries were still removed.
The posture is crucial. Parties have a defined objection period, and the assigned district judge retains authority to accept, reject, or modify the recommendation. Practitioners and readers should not report the recommended amount as an entered fee judgment.