Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Christopher Melingonis sued SoCal Metro Holdings, LLC in the Southern District of California on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. The operative pleading was an amended complaint filed March 26, 2026, which alleges that the first violation occurred on April 22, 2025. Those are the plaintiff's allegations, and the order makes no findings on the merits. No class was certified. On October 8, 2026, the court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to serve the defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). His first response said only that he could not locate an appropriate agent for service of process.
Because that response gave no dates for earlier attempts and did not explain why service had taken almost seven months, the court ordered a supplemental response explaining his efforts in detail, including dates. The supplemental response said he first tried to serve the defendant on April 13, 2026, at the office address listed on the California Secretary of State's business search website, but the address was on a nonexistent floor. On June 6, 2026, he asked the defendant's previous counsel whether they would accept service, and counsel said they no longer represented the defendant. On October 22, 2026, which was 138 days later and after the show-cause order, he identified the registered agent on file with the Secretary of State and sent a summons and the amended complaint for service. He asked the court to discharge its order and extend the service deadline to November 23, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the extension request and dismissed the action without prejudice. It explained that Rule 4(m) requires dismissal without prejudice when a defendant is not served within ninety days after the complaint is filed, but provides two avenues for relief. The court must extend the time on a showing of good cause. It may also extend the time, in its broad discretion, absent good cause if the plaintiff shows excusable neglect. Citing Ninth Circuit authority, the court said good cause requires at minimum excusable neglect. Relevant considerations include whether the defendant had actual notice, whether the defendant would be prejudiced, and whether the plaintiff would be severely prejudiced by dismissal.
Applying those standards, the court found that the plaintiff provided no information on any factor. His supplemental response added the dates of prior attempts but was otherwise nearly identical to his first response. It did not explain why service took seven months or why 138 days passed between the June 6 contact with former counsel and the next attempt. The court also found that the plaintiff likely would not be prejudiced by dismissal. The TCPA has a four-year limitations period, and the alleged first violation was less than two years before the order, so he likely may renew his claim. Having found neither good cause nor excusable neglect, the court denied more time. It dismissed without prejudice, noting Ninth Circuit authority that a court declining to extend the service period dismisses the suit without prejudice and does not enter judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff facing a Rule 4(m) show-cause order must give a factual explanation for the delay, and listing the dates of service attempts is not enough.
- Unexplained gaps in service efforts, such as the 138 days between the June 6 and October 22 attempts, count against a finding of good cause or excusable neglect.
- Serving the registered agent only after a show-cause order issued did not persuade the court that the plaintiff had been diligent.
- The court treated the plaintiff's ability to refile within the four-year TCPA limitations period as undercutting any claim of severe prejudice from dismissal.
- The dismissal is without prejudice and no judgment was entered, so whether a renewed suit would be timely or properly served is left open.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unpublished district-court order that applies settled Ninth Circuit Rule 4(m) principles to the facts of a single case. It has no precedential weight beyond its persuasive reasoning. It shows how a court may weigh a plaintiff's failure to answer a direct order to explain service delays, especially where the first response was repeated nearly unchanged.
For litigants, the order shows that the prejudice factor can cut against a plaintiff when the limitations period has substantial time left. The court said only that the plaintiff 'likely' may renew his claim. It did not decide whether a new action would be timely, and the question of a renewed suit remains open.