Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ajet Aruci, an Albanian citizen, has a final removal order entered in 2016, upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals in 2017, with reopening denied in 2018. He is detained by ICE in McFarland. His wife, Samiya Malik, a U.S. citizen, filed an I-130 petition for him in April 2023, and it remains pending. ICE arrested him at the Sacramento airport on June 28, 2026, on the way to a USCIS interview in Buffalo, and revoked his release, citing a travel document and a planned removal. This court denied his earlier habeas petition in August 2026, finding a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Ninth Circuit and Justice Kagan declined to stay removal, and another flight was set for October 8, 2026.
On October 4, 2026, the couple filed a combined civil complaint and habeas petition with a TRO request. They allege five claims: unreasonable delay of the I-130, then pending about 1,260 days; mandamus; Malik's procedural due process; an APA and INA claim that the petition process is being used to effect removal; and Aruci's claim that detention without custody review under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(3) is unlawful. The TRO sought an order directing USCIS to adjudicate within 60 days and barring removal until then. USCIS had cancelled a rescheduled interview and transferred the file to Sacramento, and the government pledged not to remove Aruci until the court ruled.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the TRO, concluding it lacks jurisdiction to stay removal. Section 1252(g) bars claims arising from the decision or action to execute removal orders. Following Rauda v. Jennings and the Third and Eleventh Circuit decisions Rauda relied on, the court reasoned that discretion to execute a removal order includes discretion over timing, and that the bar applies however a claim is framed.
Plaintiffs argued Malik's claims are independent claims by a citizen against a different agency, citing Dhillon v. Mayorkas (N.D. Cal. 2010). The court found Dhillon, to the extent still good law, distinguishable because Malik's delay and due process claims, as pleaded, are not independent of removal timing; the complaint itself says the petition is unresolved because the beneficiary was detained and may be removed before an interview.
Even assuming parts of the delay claim could be separated, the court found no clear entitlement to relief on this record. The 180-day figure in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) is non-binding sense-of-Congress language, over three years of delay is not dispositive given a nationwide average of 60.5 months cited in another court's decision, and such claims are usually resolved on a developed record. The harms identified follow from removal, not delay. The court wondered why respondents could not simply schedule the interview and adjudicate, but held Congress has stripped its jurisdiction to stay removal. It denied injunctive relief and kept the case open.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1252(g), as applied in Rauda v. Jennings, bars a federal court from enjoining execution of a removal order, including its timing, even when removal would end a pending family-petition path to adjustment.
- Recasting the request as a citizen spouse's claim against USCIS does not avoid the bar where, as pleaded, the delay and due process claims depend on the timing of the beneficiary's removal.
- The 180-day processing goal in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) is non-binding sense-of-Congress language that at most tips the TRAC analysis slightly, and a delay of over three years is not dispositive by itself.
- Unreasonable delay claims are ordinarily resolved on a developed record, which makes them a poor fit for emergency relief.
- This is a TRO denial, not a final judgment: the case remains open, and the court did not decide the merits of the delay, mandamus, due process, or custody-review claims.
Why It Matters
The order shows how § 1252(g) can leave a citizen's pending petition and the beneficiary's removal on separate tracks: this court will not pause removal to let USCIS finish, however the claim is styled. The court itself questioned why the agencies could not simply schedule the interview and adjudicate, yet treated that as a matter for the executive.
It is an unreported district court order on preliminary relief, so it carries limited precedential weight. Whether a claim genuinely independent of removal timing, such as one limited to compelling adjudication, could proceed remains open, and the case stays pending.