Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Justin Tyrell Luster, an inmate at West Reentry Treatment & Housing in Richmond, California, filed a pro se civil rights action in the Northern District of California. The caption named CDCR, Landcaster Hospital and Highland Hospital. The body of the complaint named three individuals identified only by position: a radiologist at Highland Hospital, a radiologist at Landcaster Hospital, and an ENT doctor at Stockton General Hospital. He had been granted in forma pauperis status in a separate order, and the complaint came before the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That statute requires dismissal of prisoner claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek money from immune defendants. Pro se pleadings are liberally construed.
The court noted that the faint handwriting made the complaint hard to read and summarized what it appeared to allege. Luster said defendants repeatedly and falsely told him nothing was inside his body, and that an object placed in him could be harmful, deadly and a cancer risk. He also said a chip implanted in his body and brain at Landcaster let others know his thoughts and control him, and that relatives were stealing his ideas and had him jailed. These are the plaintiff's allegations as the court described them, not findings. He sought punitive damages, money damages and injunctive relief.
The Court’s Holding
The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on four grounds. First, it alleged no violation of federal law or the Constitution, which § 1983 requires under West v. Atkins. Second, the court stated that the defendants were not acting under color of state law, the other required element. The order states these two conclusions briefly, without extended analysis. Third, the case cannot proceed against unidentified defendants. The court explained that Doe pleading is disfavored in the Ninth Circuit under Gillespie v. Civiletti because the Marshal cannot serve an anonymous defendant, and that naming a person only by job, such as the Highland Hospital radiologist, is suing an unidentified defendant. It noted that its usual practice is to dismiss Doe defendants without prejudice and allow amendment if they are later identified. Fourth, the claims that a chip was implanted and that family members control him through it were found irrational and implausible. The court relied on Neitzke v. Williams for its authority to dismiss claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Although the section heading refers to dismissal with leave to amend, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice because amendment would be futile. It cited Lopez v. Smith for the rule that leave to amend is granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by other facts. The order then dismissed the action with prejudice, entered judgment for Defendants, terminated pending motions as moot, and closed the case. No defendant appears to have been served or to have responded, and the court made no finding about the adequacy of any medical care.
Key Takeaways
- Prisoner complaints against governmental entities or employees are screened under § 1915A, and courts must dismiss claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek relief from immune defendants.
- A § 1983 plaintiff must plead both a violation of federal rights and conduct under color of state law, and this order found both missing.
- Suing a defendant only by job title and workplace is treated as suing an unidentified Doe defendant, which the Ninth Circuit disfavors, and the court's usual remedy is dismissal without prejudice with leave to name the person.
- Courts may dismiss claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios without accepting their truth, and this order treated the implanted-chip and mind-control allegations that way.
- Dismissal with prejudice rested on futility, because the court concluded no additional facts could cure the pleading.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court screening order, so it carries no precedential weight. It applies settled Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority to a pro se prisoner complaint and does not announce a new rule. It shows how courts use § 1915A to resolve a case before service when the allegations are legally insufficient and factually implausible.
The order also shows the limits of liberal construction for pro se litigants. Pleadings must still allege facts supporting a cognizable federal claim against identifiable state actors. Its sharpest feature is the with-prejudice outcome, which departs from the court's usual practice with Doe defendants because the court found the core allegations incurable. It does not decide whether the plaintiff could pursue any distinct, properly pleaded claim in a new action, and it should not be read to say anything about the merits of medical-care claims generally.