California Case Summaries

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. LX Hausys America, Inc. — Court Refuses to Reconsider Denial of Interlocutory Appeal in Silica Coverage Dispute

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company et al. v. LX Hausys America, Inc.
Court
U.S. District Court — Central District of California
Judge
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER (William J. Clinton, 1997)
Date Decided
2026-11-02
Docket No.
2:25-cv-07207
Status
Unreported
Topics
insurance-law, civil-procedure, litigation, duty to defend, silica exclusion, interlocutory appeal, reconsideration

Background

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Liberty Insurance Corporation (together, Liberty) sued LX Hausys America, Inc. in August 2025, seeking declarations that they owe Hausys no duty to defend or indemnify in more than one hundred underlying suits alleging injuries from silica and other contaminants in Hausys's stone products. Hausys counterclaimed for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On March 31, 2026, the court denied Liberty's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that neither the silica exclusions nor the pollution exclusions relieved Liberty of its duty to defend, because the underlying allegations were ambiguous as to whether some injuries were caused not by silica but by other chemicals or toxins in products such as HIMACS.

On July 6, 2026, the court denied Liberty's request to certify that ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and to stay the case, reasoning that reasonable judges would not differ on whether the underlying actions potentially allege an injury not caused by silica. Liberty then moved for reconsideration, filed late with a good-cause showing that Hausys did not dispute. It relied on August 27, 2026 orders by another judge in this district in five related silica-exclusion cases, which certified for appeal an apparent tension between the concurrent causation doctrine and the broad reading of 'arising out of' in exclusions. Liberty argued the same tension affects the LIC exclusion and that those appeals would not address the LM Fire wording. Hausys responded that the orders involve different policies, insureds and allegations and show at most different applications of settled law.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied reconsideration of the July 6 order, including the stay request. It first doubted that Liberty had satisfied Local Rule 7-18 at all. The August 27 orders are nonprecedential decisions of another court in the district. Relying on Camreta v. Greene and Central District decisions, the court reasoned that such decisions do not present a material difference in law or a change of law, and are unlikely to qualify as new material facts. It framed this as an initial concern rather than its sole basis.

Assuming those orders qualified, the court still found no substantial ground for difference of opinion on its controlling question, whether the silica exclusions relieve Liberty of the duty to defend. The August 27 orders concern injuries from a combination of silica and non-silica causes. This court's March ruling instead rested on allegations that could describe injuries caused entirely by non-silica substances, so concurrent causation had little bearing. The other orders did not explain how that doctrine could apply to a single non-silica cause, and they recognized that such allegations defeat judgment on the pleadings, appearing consistent with this court's ruling. Even an intradistrict split would not suffice, because the Ninth Circuit has not treated district court disagreement as a substantial ground and courts look chiefly to disputes among circuits. The court did not reach Liberty's efficiency arguments.

Key Takeaways

  • Nonprecedential orders from other judges in the same district are unlikely to supply a change of law or new material facts under Local Rule 7-18.
  • The concurrent causation doctrine addresses a single, indivisible injury from multiple causes, so allegations of injury caused entirely by a non-excluded substance fall outside it.
  • Disagreement among district judges, standing alone, does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion under § 1292(b).
  • Denying reconsideration leaves the March 31, 2026 ruling that Liberty must defend Hausys in place, with no certified appeal.

Why It Matters

The order shows how narrowly the Central District applies Local Rule 7-18 and how hard it is to obtain interlocutory review of a duty-to-defend ruling. Even when another judge in the same district certifies a related question, a court may conclude that its own ruling rests on different reasoning and decline to revisit it.

The ruling is limited. It is an interlocutory minute order, not a final judgment, and it does not decide the duty to indemnify or Hausys's counterclaims. The case continues in the district court, and the Ninth Circuit may still address the related questions in the other cases.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

Scroll to Top