Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Apple Altura Levy, born in 1977, and her brother Paskinell Tijares Altura, born in 1980, sued the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) in the Central District of California, seeking declarations of United States citizenship. They claimed birth in Easley, South Carolina, and the court tried that theory under the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) in a bench trial on June 2, 2026.
In 2018 the South Carolina Family Court, after the state agency declined administrative registration for insufficient documentation, ordered delayed birth certificates naming Easley under S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-100. Those orders credited the plaintiffs' testimony and relied on infant immunization entries dated about two months after birth, later Pickens County schooling, and 1980 census information.
The trial record also contained Philippine birth records, Philippine passports the plaintiffs acknowledged using, and visa records listing Philippine birth. Levy swore in a 2007 passport application to Guam birth and in 2019 to South Carolina birth; Altura swore to Hawaii birth in 2004 and South Carolina birth in 2019. Altura also certified a military record listing only a California high school, despite testifying that he schooled in the Philippines.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied both declarations and directed judgment for the Secretary. It found each plaintiff was born in the Philippines. For Levy it relied on her Philippine birth record, the Philippine passport she signed and used, her visa history, and a Philippine birthplace entry in her South Carolina school record. For Altura it relied on his Philippine birth record, acknowledged passport history, use of Philippine passports, and visa records. It did not credit either plaintiff's testimony of South Carolina birth or the effort to blame the conflicting sworn statements on their parents. It stressed that these were affirmative findings of foreign birth, not merely a conclusion that the plaintiffs' evidence was less convincing.
Under Moncada v. Rubio, 153 F.4th 733 (9th Cir. 2025), substantial credible evidence of citizenship shifts to the government the burden of proving noncitizenship by clear and convincing evidence. The court found the state orders and certificates did not themselves supply such proof, but for an independent alternative holding it assumed in each plaintiff's favor that the threshold was met. It then found foreign birth highly probable even after giving weight to the vaccination inference, the state adjudications, the delayed certificates, and claimed earlier passports. It added that, under an ordinary preponderance standard, neither plaintiff proved United States birth.
The court treated the state orders as evidence, not binding determinations, noting that the plaintiffs disclaimed formal preclusion and that the South Carolina statute does not confer citizenship, and it found any presumption from the certificates overcome. It declined to treat lost Philippine hospital records as proof that the Philippine certificates were false, and it did not hold that Philippine passport use extinguished any citizenship. Costs follow under Rule 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
Key Takeaways
- A federal court deciding a § 1503(a) claim determines nationality independently and may weigh, rather than defer to, a state court's delayed-birth-certificate order.
- Repeated, inconsistent sworn passport applications and acknowledged use of foreign travel documents can outweigh a later reconstructed account of United States birth.
- Infant vaccination records show presence at that time, not place of birth, and the court gave them favorable weight without treating them as decisive.
- The judgment rests on two independent grounds: clear and convincing proof of foreign birth under an assumed shifted burden, and failure to prove United States birth by a preponderance.
Why It Matters
The decision shows how a district court may apply Moncada where the place of birth itself is disputed, rather than a legal exception to birthright citizenship. Because the court assumed the threshold was met for its alternative holding, it does not settle what evidence triggers the shifted burden in such cases, and the court said its view of these state records is specific to them.
This is a fact-bound set of bench-trial findings from a single district judge and does not bind other courts. Parties in similar cases should expect courts to compare the full documentary history, including visas and passport applications, against any state-court findings.