Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Layth Raad Kamil, proceeding pro se while in ICE custody, sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ICE detained him on January 23, 2025, for removal proceedings. An immigration court ordered his removal on September 8, 2025, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal on July 1, 2026, making the removal order administratively final. Kamil petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit, which denied a stay of removal on October 1, 2026; that petition remained pending when the magistrate judge issued this order and findings and recommendations on October 19, 2026.
Kamil argued that his detention was prolonged and that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. He also filed a motion asking the court to appoint counsel. The magistrate judge explained that federal habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention, but relief requires custody that violates the Constitution or federal law. The recommendation addressed whether the duration and circumstances of Kamil's detention authorized release at this stage, not whether the underlying removal order was correct.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge concluded that the BIA's July 1, 2026 dismissal started the 90-day statutory removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), during which detention was mandatory. Although that period had recently ended, Kamil remained within the six-month period that Zadvydas v. Davis treats as presumptively reasonable when detention is related to effectuating removal. Under Zadvydas, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute; after six months, a detainee's good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely shifts to the government the burden of rebutting that showing.
The court found that Kamil had not supplied a reason to believe replacement travel documentation could not be obtained. He had attached a travel document from his home country permitting removal from January 23, 2026, through July 21, 2026. Although it had expired, the court treated the absence of evidence that another document could not be procured as significant. It therefore concluded that detention beyond the 90-day period remained authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and recommended denying the petition without prejudice.
The recommendation expressly preserved a future challenge if Kamil is not removed within Zadvydas's six-month presumptively reasonable period. A new petition could address prolonged detention and whether removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The magistrate judge also recommended entry of judgment and case closure, but those matters remained recommendations to the assigned district judge, subject to written objections within fourteen days of service. Separately, the court ordered the counsel motion denied, finding no absolute right to appointed habeas counsel and no present showing that the interests of justice required appointment.
Key Takeaways
- The petition was recommended for denial without prejudice, not adjudicated as a final rejection of every possible future detention challenge.
- The decisive timing point was that Kamil remained within Zadvydas's presumptively reasonable six-month period even though the 90-day statutory removal period had ended.
- The expired travel document did not establish that removal was unlikely because Kamil offered no reason to believe a replacement could not be procured.
- The order left open a renewed habeas petition if removal does not occur within the six-month period and the petitioner addresses the likelihood of reasonably foreseeable removal.
- The denial of appointed counsel was an immediate order, while denial of the habeas petition and entry of judgment were recommendations requiring district-judge action.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Zadvydas's timing and burden-shifting framework to a detainee whose direct immigration review remained pending and whose request for a stay of removal had been denied. It distinguishes the end of the mandatory 90-day removal period from the later point at which prolonged detention may require the government to rebut a showing that removal is not reasonably foreseeable.
The without-prejudice recommendation is important to its scope: the court did not hold that detention could continue indefinitely. It identified a concrete path for a renewed petition after the six-month period and paired that preservation with its stated intention that Kamil be lawfully removed as soon as practicable. The separate counsel ruling also shows the different procedural treatment of the immediately decided motion and the recommended habeas disposition.