California Case Summaries

Laureano Garcia Godinez v. David A. Marin, et al. — Post-Order Detention Provisions Inapplicable Prior to Final Removal Order and Unpled Pre-Order Relief Barred by Party Presentation Principle

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Laureano Garcia Godinez v. David A. Marin, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Central District of California
Judge
FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA (Donald Trump, 2020)
Date Decided
2026-11-17
Docket No.
5:26-cv-02552
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, pre-final order detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), post-removal detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), Zadvydas v. Davis, party presentation principle, leave to amend

Background

Petitioner Laureano Garcia Godinez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States with his family in late January 2024, at which point he was apprehended by the United States Border Patrol, served with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear, and released on recognizance under Form I-220A. Garcia Godinez remained in the United States while removal proceedings remained pending before an Immigration Judge, with no final order of removal ever having been issued against him.

In February 2026, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office arrested Garcia Godinez on state criminal charges, which Garcia Godinez contended did not proceed to conviction or formal factual findings. Following that criminal arrest, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement took Garcia Godinez into custody in April 2026 based on the pending charges. Garcia Godinez subsequently commenced this federal habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in May 2026, asserting that his detention infringed his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and associated regulations under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13, and ran afoul of Supreme Court precedent governing reasonably foreseeable removal under Zadvydas v. Davis. Specifically, Garcia Godinez contended that respondents failed to comply with administrative review procedures before revoking his release and that his prolonged detention lacked any reasonable likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future.

The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation analyzing the petition. The Magistrate Judge determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) did not apply to Garcia Godinez due to the absence of a final removal order, but nonetheless recommended that the district court find his continued detention unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which governs detention pending removal proceedings.

The Court’s Holding

United States District Judge Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in part and declined to adopt it in part, denying the habeas petition with thirty days' leave to amend. The district court agreed that the post-order detention framework set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13 does not apply to noncitizens who are not under a final order of removal, rendering Garcia Godinez's reliance on those authorities and the temporal limitations established in Zadvydas misplaced. The court underscored that § 1231(a) exclusively governs custody following a final order of removal, whereas petitioner's removal proceedings remain actively pending before an Immigration Judge.

However, the district court declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to grant relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Adhering to the party presentation principle reaffirmed in Clark v. Sweeney, the court emphasized that federal courts serve as neutral arbiters tasked with ruling solely on the claims framed and presented by the parties themselves, calling balls and strikes rather than taking a turn at bat. Because Garcia Godinez did not plead, argue, or establish entitlement to relief under § 1226(a), the court refused to supply unraised statutory theories sua sponte, granting thirty days' leave to file an amended petition to properly articulate any viable grounds for relief, with respondents' answer due twenty-one days thereafter.

Key Takeaways

  • Detention challenges by noncitizens whose removal proceedings remain pending before an Immigration Judge cannot be grounded in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) or Zadvydas v. Davis, which exclusively govern custody following a final order of removal.
  • Under the party presentation principle, a district court will not sua sponte grant habeas relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) if the petitioner failed to raise or brief that statutory basis in their petition.
  • When a habeas petitioner misidentifies the statutory framework governing executive custody, courts may deny the petition while granting leave to amend so the claims can be properly framed.
  • Failure to file an amended petition within the court-mandated thirty-day period will result in dismissal of the action, while any timely amendment triggers a twenty-one-day response deadline for the government.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the rigid statutory divide in federal immigration law between pre-final-order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and post-final-order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Petitioners challenging prolonged or unlawful immigration detention must accurately align their legal arguments with their specific procedural posture, as remedies designed for final removal orders cannot be retrofitted to ongoing proceedings.

Furthermore, the ruling illustrates the strict application of the party presentation principle in federal habeas practice. Citing Clark v. Sweeney, the decision clarifies that district courts will refrain from adopting magistrate recommendations that grant relief on unpleaded grounds, requiring litigants to take the initiative to amend their pleadings rather than relying on judicial correction.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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