Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In December 2024, Justine Owen filed a request for a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, and Kelvin Claud filed a response. The register of actions suggests that each filing included multiple documents, but the request, response, and accompanying documents were not included in the record on appeal. The trial court referred the parties to family court services for a mediation and evaluation; a report was prepared and provided to the trial court, but that report also was not included in the appellate record. On March 4, 2025, the trial court held a hearing at which both parties testified. During the testimony, the parties referenced a declaration by Claud and a video, but neither item was included in the record on appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a domestic violence restraining order against Claud.
Claud appealed and argued that the trial court abused its discretion by considering extra-record evidence, misapplied the DVPA in weighing the evidence, erred by denying his competing request for a restraining order, and made factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal identified John W. Burdick as the Temporary Judge in the underlying Superior Court of San Bernardino County action. Owen did not appear on appeal and did not file a respondent's brief.
The Court’s Holding
The court explained that a DVPA protective order may issue to prevent recurrence of domestic violence and ensure separation, upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse, and that custody or visitation orders may accompany such an order. It identified the governing standards of review: abuse of discretion for DVPA and custody or visitation orders, de novo review of whether the correct legal standard was applied, substantial-evidence review of factual findings, and reversal of a discretionary ruling only when it exceeds the bounds of reason.
Applying the fundamental appellate rule that an appellant defaults when the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the court held that Claud failed to carry his burden to show prejudicial error. Because the written submissions, declarations, documentary evidence, family-services report, and video were omitted, the court could not determine whether the trial court relied on extra-record facts, weighed evidence improperly, made unsupported findings, or committed prejudicial error. The court therefore affirmed the restraining order without reaching the merits of the underlying abuse allegations. The disposition also states that respondent is to recover her costs on appeal; footnote 2 explains that the court determined only that Owen is the prevailing party entitled to costs under California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a), and expressed no opinion on whether the trial court should award any costs as reasonable upon a verified memorandum under rule 8.278(c).
Key Takeaways
- An appellant challenging a DVPA restraining order must provide a record sufficient to permit review of both the asserted error and any resulting prejudice.
- The omission of the parties' written submissions, declarations, documentary evidence, family-services report, and video left the appellate court unable to evaluate Claud's evidentiary, competing-request, and substantial-evidence claims.
- The court affirmed because the appellate record was inadequate and Claud could not establish prejudicial error, not because it independently resolved the merits of the abuse allegations.
- Owen was determined to be the prevailing party entitled to recover appellate costs under rule 8.278(a), while the reasonableness of any particular costs under rule 8.278(c) was expressly left undecided.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that an incomplete evidentiary record can independently defeat all of an appellant's challenges to a domestic violence restraining order, including claims of extra-record evidence, improper weighing, denial of a competing request, and unsupported findings. It also carefully separates the appellate court's prevailing-party costs determination from the distinct reasonableness question that the opinion expressly leaves to the trial court under the verified-memorandum procedure.