Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Juan Reyes Cardonas Martinez, an immigration detainee proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order in the Eastern District of California. The case was docketed as No. 1:26-cv-07465-KES-FJS. The petition challenged his detention after the government had previously released him under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and later detained him again while removal proceedings were pending.
The court had previously addressed the legal framework presented by the petition. Under its earlier decisions, when a noncitizen was released under § 1226(a) and subsequently re-detained pending removal proceedings, due process required a bond hearing. At that hearing, the government had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen was a flight risk or a danger to the community.
The court ordered the respondents to show cause whether any factual or legal issues distinguished this case from those earlier orders and justified denying relief. The respondents answered that Martinez was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) pursuant to what they described as an administratively final and imminently executable in absentia removal order dated August 7, 2026. The court therefore treated the finality of that order as the central issue in evaluating the asserted detention authority.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the respondents’ finality argument. Because the in absentia removal order was issued only on August 7, 2026, Martinez’s 180-day period to seek reopening had not expired. The court concluded that the order was not yet final and that Martinez was not currently subject to detention under § 1231. It relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cui v. Garland, which explains that an in absentia order generally becomes final at the end of the 180-day period for filing a motion to reopen when no timely motion is filed.
The court explained the connection between reopening and appellate review. An in absentia removal order cannot be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals without first filing a motion to reopen before the immigration judge within 180 days. If that deadline passes without a timely motion, the opportunity ultimately to obtain Board review expires as well. The court also cited district decisions applying the same reasoning, including Li v. Albarran and E.G.M. v. Scott.
Having rejected § 1231 as the present basis for detention, the court applied its prior due-process rulings to Martinez’s release and subsequent re-detention under § 1226(a). It granted the habeas petition and ordered a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker within ten days of the date of the Order. The respondents must prove flight risk or dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. The order also requires 72 hours’ written notice in a language Martinez can understand, permits representation by counsel, and directs consideration of his financial circumstances and alternatives to detention without bond. If the hearing is not provided within that ten-day period, the respondents must release him.
Key Takeaways
- An August 7, 2026 in absentia removal order was not final while Martinez’s 180-day period to seek reopening remained unexpired.
- The court held that Martinez was not currently subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 on the basis asserted by the respondents.
- Prior release under § 1226(a), followed by re-detention, entitled Martinez to a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause.
- The government must prove flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence at the ordered hearing.
- The respondents must provide the hearing within ten days of the date of the Order; if they do not, they must release Martinez, and the neutral decisionmaker must consider financial circumstances and alternative release conditions.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the Ninth Circuit’s finality analysis to prevent the government from treating a recent in absentia removal order as final before the reopening period expires. It also shows how the asserted statutory basis for detention can determine whether the government must satisfy the court’s due-process bond-hearing requirements.
The relief is procedural and conditional rather than an unconditional immediate release order. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment for Martinez and close the case, while requiring service of the order on the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center. The order does not itself decide whether Martinez is a flight risk or danger; that determination is left to the neutral decisionmaker under the specified burden of proof.