Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
This civil rights action arises from allegations by plaintiffs Joseph Amey and Warren Amey that defendants Andrew Patterson, Andrew Falvey, Najee Burge, and the County of Sacramento subjected them to an unlawful arrest, an unreasonable seizure, and excessive force. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in August 2024, and defendants answered in October 2024. Following an unsuccessful magistrate judge settlement conference in June 2025, the district court twice granted joint motions to modify the scheduling order. The operative January 15, 2026 scheduling order set a fact discovery cutoff of April 14, 2026, an initial expert disclosure deadline of May 15, 2026, a supplemental expert disclosure cutoff of June 15, 2026, and a dispositive motion deadline of September 14, 2026. Defendants timely filed expert disclosures on May 15, 2026, but plaintiffs filed none.
On June 15, 2026, plaintiffs moved to modify the scheduling order, requesting a forty-five-day extension of fact discovery, a seventy-five-day extension for expert disclosures, a one-hundred-five-day extension for supplemental disclosures, and a one-hundred-sixty-five-day extension for dispositive motions. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants produced an inadequately prepared person-most-knowledgeable deponent on March 31, 2026, necessitating a replacement deposition. In early May 2026, defense counsel agreed to stipulate to an extension solely to complete that deposition. However, plaintiffs subsequently sent a broader stipulation seeking to extend expert discovery as well, which defense counsel rejected. In their opposition, defendants agreed to a limited fact discovery extension solely for the outstanding deposition and did not oppose extending the dispositive motion deadline, but opposed reopening expert discovery. Plaintiffs filed no reply.
The Court’s Holding
Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion. Because the fact discovery cutoff expired on April 14, 2026, and the expert disclosure deadline expired on May 15, 2026—two months and one month before plaintiffs moved—plaintiffs had to demonstrate both good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) and excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1)(B). Addressing fact discovery, the court found good cause and excusable neglect to allow completion of the outstanding deposition because defendants consented, suffered no prejudice, and plaintiffs demonstrated general diligence. Rather than granting the requested forty-five days, the court limited the extension to thirty days from the electronic filing date of the order, deeming that period sufficient to complete the single noticed deposition. The court also found good cause to extend the unexpired dispositive motion deadline by ninety days.
Conversely, the court denied plaintiffs' request to reopen expert discovery. Reviewing the equitable factors under Pioneer, the court noted that while defendants claimed no prejudice and proceedings were not disrupted, the reason for the delay weighed heavily against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs knew the allegedly inadequate deposition occurred on March 31, 2026, six weeks prior to the May 15 expert disclosure deadline, yet made no disclosures and failed to seek an extension before the deadline expired. Deeming plaintiffs' attempt to fold an expert discovery extension into a fact discovery request disingenuous gamesmanship, the court held that plaintiffs failed to establish excusable neglect. Additionally, because plaintiffs served no initial disclosures, no extension of the supplemental disclosure deadline was warranted.
Key Takeaways
- A motion to modify a scheduling order filed after the expiration of a deadline requires the moving party to demonstrate both good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) and excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1)(B).
- Under the Pioneer equitable analysis, the reason for the delay and whether it was within the movant's reasonable control constitute critical factors that cannot be overcome by the absence of prejudice to the non-moving party.
- Where an opposing party consents to extending fact discovery solely to complete a specific deposition, the district court may grant the request while independently limiting the extension to the time strictly necessary to complete that task.
- Parties cannot revive expired expert disclosure deadlines by piggybacking them onto fact discovery requests without providing an independent, persuasive justification for failing to act before the deadline passed.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the rigid application of the dual-standard framework governing post-expiration deadline modifications in federal civil litigation. While courts exercise equitable discretion under Rule 6(b)(1)(B) to accommodate cooperative adjustments—such as completing an agreed-upon deposition delayed despite diligent efforts—they will not permit parties to leverage narrow fact discovery issues to resurrect unrelated, expired deadlines. By strictly enforcing the expert cutoff against plaintiffs who offered no reason for missing it, the ruling warns practitioners that diligence and contemporaneous extensions remain vital to preserving evidentiary rights.