Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
John Andraos and Lauren Bissada, formerly romantic partners, executed a settlement agreement and general release on August 11, 2025. Andraos alleged that he had sued to recover approximately $63,000 in loans and that Bissada had petitioned for a domestic violence restraining order around the same time. Under the settlement, he agreed to accept $45,000, and both parties agreed to dismiss their respective legal actions with prejudice. Andraos dismissed his lawsuit, but Bissada did not dismiss her DVRO proceeding.
Andraos filed this action in September 2025. His eight causes of action included contract and implied-covenant claims based on the settlement, a separate contract claim concerning an alleged $55,000 promissory note, fraudulent inducement, deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Bissada filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, arguing that the suit targeted her protected DVRO litigation and invoking the litigation privilege, public policy, duress, and release. On December 3, 2025, the trial court struck the entire complaint and deemed Bissada's concurrently filed demurrer moot.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed that most claims arose from protected petitioning because their basis was Bissada's continued prosecution of the DVRO action. The promissory-note claim was different: its alleged breach was nonpayment of a loan, not speech or petitioning. A possible release or accord and satisfaction might supply a defense, but could not transform nonpayment into protected activity. The court therefore held that the second cause of action was improperly struck at step one.
At step two, the court accepted that Andraos had sufficiently pleaded and substantiated his claims and asked whether any defense defeated them as a matter of law. It upheld dismissal of the three tort claims because the alleged settlement misrepresentations and continued DVRO litigation were communicative conduct protected by the litigation privilege. It reached a different conclusion for the contract claims and their derivative declaratory and specific-performance claims. Applying the privilege to alleged nonperformance of a settlement would not further finality, avoidance of unending litigation, or California's policy favoring settlement.
The remaining defenses also did not justify striking the contract claims. Duress presented disputed facts, including the agreement's statement that it was freely and voluntarily executed and the November 2025 dismissal of the DVRO petition for failure to meet the burden of proof. Nor was a promise to dismiss an existing DVRO action categorically against public policy; the agreement did not prohibit a future petition. Finally, dismissal of Andraos's earlier loan action did not bar claims based on Bissada's later alleged breach. The court directed the trial court to grant the motion only as to the fourth through sixth causes of action and deny it as to the rest, leaving the demurrer available on remand.
Key Takeaways
- A contract claim based on failure to repay a promissory note does not arise from protected petitioning merely because a settlement may release or otherwise bar the claim.
- The litigation privilege barred tort claims founded on settlement representations and continued DVRO litigation, but it did not conclusively bar claims for breach of the settlement itself.
- Conflicting evidence about duress and domestic violence could not establish a preclusive defense under the anti-SLAPP statute's minimal-merit standard.
- Requiring dismissal of a pending DVRO action was not shown to violate public policy as a matter of law, particularly where the agreement did not restrict future DVRO filings.
- The remand permits the surviving claims and unresolved demurrer to proceed; it does not finally determine whether the settlement released the promissory-note claim.
Why It Matters
The decision separates the two anti-SLAPP inquiries: a potentially meritorious release defense does not establish that a claim arises from protected activity, and protected activity underlying a claim does not end the analysis if the plaintiff shows minimal merit. It also explains why enforcing an alleged settlement promise can differ from imposing tort liability for litigation-related communications.
The ruling is narrow and procedural. Andraos's contract-based claims survive the special motion to strike, while his fraudulent-inducement, deceit, and emotional-distress claims remain stricken. The court did not resolve the ultimate validity of the settlement, the disputed duress allegations, or every potential defense to the promissory-note claim.