California Case Summaries

John A. Scott v. Vickie Emanuel and Sheryl Turcotte — Motion to Reopen Denied as Untimely and Unjustified Under Rule 60(b)

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
John A. Scott v. Vickie Emanuel and Sheryl Turcotte
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
James E. Simmons Jr. (Joe Biden, 2023)
Date Decided
2026-10-23
Docket No.
3:22-cv-01955
Status
Unreported
Topics
civil procedure, federal courts, Rule 60(b), private right of action, 18 U.S.C. § 241, subject matter jurisdiction, pro se litigation

Background

Plaintiff John A. Scott, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint on December 9, 2022, alleging that Defendants Vickie Emanuel and Sheryl Turcotte conspired to deprive him of the right to live in his legal residence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. He simultaneously moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel. On January 23, 2023, Scott filed an ex parte motion to dismiss without prejudice, stating all matters had been resolved. The next day, the court denied IFP status, dismissed the complaint sua sponte, and declared the motion for counsel moot. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a criminal statute with no private right of action, that it lacked federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, and granted leave to amend and pay the filing fee by March 1, 2023, after which the complaint would be dismissed with prejudice. On January 26, 2023, the court granted Scott's motion to dismiss without prejudice.

On September 3, 2026—more than three and a half years after the dismissal order—Scott filed the instant Motion to Reopen. He claimed that previously unknown co-conspirators, Jefferson Stacer and Sharon Scott, had since been identified and had filed two false abuse allegations, the first around the time the original action was filed in 2022 and the second at an undetermined later date. The court construed the pro se motion liberally as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

The Court’s Holding

The court denied the Motion to Reopen. It held the motion untimely under Rule 60(c) because it was filed more than three years after the January 2023 dismissal order, which automatically precludes relief under Rule 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect), (b)(2) (newly discovered evidence), and (b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct), all of which carry a one-year time limit. As to the remaining grounds, the court found none applicable: the judgment was not void under Rule 60(b)(4), had not been reversed or vacated under Rule 60(b)(5), and no other reason justified relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

The court emphasized that the discovery of additional defendants does not cure the complaint's fatal defects. The original dismissal rested on the absence of a private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction—defects that persist regardless of newly identified parties. Citing Recinos v. Concerto Healthcare and Odish v. Cognitive Code, the court reiterated that Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy granted only in exceptional circumstances, which Scott failed to demonstrate. The court advised Scott that if he wishes to pursue his action, he may refile a complaint under a new case number with payment of the filing fee or a completed IFP request.

Key Takeaways

  • A motion to reopen filed more than one year after judgment is time-barred under Rule 60(b)(1)–(3); a three-and-a-half-year delay is per se untimely.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a criminal conspiracy statute that does not create a private civil cause of action.
  • Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1332 when the complaint alleges only a criminal statute violation and fails to plead diversity.
  • Newly identified co-conspirators or additional defendants do not cure a complaint's fundamental jurisdictional and failure-to-state-a-claim defects.
  • Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and requires exceptional circumstances; mere passage of time and new parties are insufficient.

Why It Matters

This order reinforces the strict time limits of Rule 60(b) and the principle that procedural mechanisms for relief from judgment cannot revive claims that were legally insufficient from the outset. It serves as a reminder that pro se litigants, while entitled to liberal construction of their filings, remain bound by jurisdictional requirements and statutory interpretation—criminal statutes do not implicitly create private rights of action. The court's suggestion to refile under a new case number with proper fee payment or IFP application preserves the plaintiff's ability to bring a viable claim, should one exist, without prejudicing the finality of the prior dismissal.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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