Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for a temporary restraining order in the Southern District of California on September 30, 2026. The respondents were the warden of the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility and others. On October 14, 2026, the court denied the petition, concluding that the claims were repetitive of a prior petition and that any challenge to the immigration judge's bond determination remained unexhausted. Judgment was entered the same day.
On October 27, 2026, Petitioner moved to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The order recites the rule's 28-day window and the filing date, then reaches the merits without a separate timeliness discussion. According to the court, the motion reiterated arguments made in the petition and in an earlier motion to alter judgment filed in a prior case, No. 26-cv-4815. Petitioner argued that he was not challenging the immigration judge's adverse bond determination and that exhaustion requirements should be excused.
The earlier order and the judgment are referenced but not reproduced in this order, so the details of the repetitiveness and exhaustion rulings are known only through the summary the court gives here.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the Rule 59(e) motion in a short two-page order. It began with the governing standard: a Rule 59(e) motion is an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources. It cited Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, Wood v. Ryan, and Kona Enterprises v. Estate of Bishop. Under Kona Enterprises, reconsideration is not granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or there is an intervening change in controlling law.
Applying that standard, the court concluded that Petitioner had not met the high threshold for altering or amending the judgment. The order describes no newly discovered evidence and no intervening change in law. It characterizes the motion as reiterating arguments already made, namely that Petitioner was not challenging the bond determination and that exhaustion should be excused. Citing Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, a Southern District of California decision, and Norris v. Youngblood, an Eastern District of California decision, the court held that disagreement with its analysis of the petition does not, without more, establish clear error. A reconsideration motion cannot be used to ask the court to rethink what it has already thought through.
The disposition is a denial of the motion only. The order does not revisit the merits of the underlying petition, does not state whether the earlier denial was with or without prejudice, and does not address any appeal. The earlier judgment therefore remains as entered.
Key Takeaways
- A Rule 59(e) motion is treated as an extraordinary remedy, and absent highly unusual circumstances the movant must show newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law.
- Restating arguments from the original habeas petition or from an earlier reconsideration motion does not satisfy that standard.
- Disagreement with the court's reasoning, including its exhaustion analysis, is not by itself clear error.
- The motion was filed 13 days after judgment, but the order rests on the substantive standard rather than on timing.
- The order denies reconsideration only; it does not reconsider the underlying habeas claims on their merits.
Why It Matters
This is a routine, unpublished district court order and carries no precedential weight. Its value lies in showing how the Southern District of California applies established Ninth Circuit reconsideration principles when a pro se detainee seeks a second look at a ruling on repetitiveness and exhaustion. The order cites no new facts and decides the motion by comparing what was argued before with what was argued again.
The order leaves several matters open. It does not address whether a bond challenge could proceed after exhaustion, it does not impose any filing restriction, and it says nothing about appeal rights. It does show that the court tracks repeated filings across dockets, since it refers to a prior case and an earlier motion to alter judgment. A litigant seeking relief under Rule 59(e) must present new evidence, a change in law, or a showing of clear error rather than repeat earlier positions.