Reported / Citable
Background
A.O. and Alina Vologodskaya were married. In August 2023, A.O. filed for divorce, requested a domestic violence restraining order, and asked that she pay some or all of his attorney fees and costs. In November, she sought her own restraining order and spousal support. The court set the competing requests for a long cause hearing in January 2024, and A.O.'s trial brief again requested fees incurred in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceeding.
On the hearing day, both parties, represented by counsel, recited a settlement on the record. It provided for a one-year restraining order protecting A.O.; Vologodskaya's admission of domestic abuse warranting the order and dismissal of her own request with prejudice; temporary spousal support; a $50,000 advance to each party on their community interest; and an express reservation of jurisdiction over any future bonus or additional income for support. The recitation did not mention attorney fees. A.O.'s attorney prepared the findings and order after hearing (FOAH) and the restraining order after hearing (ROAH). The FOAH stated attorney fees were not applicable, the ROAH's fee section was blank, and the FOAH carried its standard sentence reserving all other issues. The orders were filed on February 1, 2024.
In April 2025, A.O. moved for $75,476 in fees under section 6344, arguing he prevailed on his own request and successfully defended against hers. Vologodskaya opposed the motion as untimely under rule 3.1702. After hearings in October and December 2025, the trial court ordered her to pay $39,000 in February 2026. The dissolution itself remained pending.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed the fee order. Rule 3.1702 governs claims for statutory attorney fees, has no exception for family law cases, and applies to section 6344 because that statute sets no deadline of its own. Under the rule, a motion for fees for services through the rendition of judgment must be served and filed within the time to appeal, which is at most 180 days. A.O. waited 14 months after the restraining order issued, so his request was untimely.
The court treated the stipulated restraining order as a final judgment for rule 3.1702 purposes as to the parties' competing restraining order requests, even though the dissolution remained pending, because nothing was left to litigate on those requests once they settled. It also rejected the argument that the fee request in A.O.'s petition and the FOAH's standard reservation of all other issues preserved the claim. The settlement was silent on fees, both sides had counsel, the orders' fee-specific sections indicated no fee order, and jurisdiction was expressly reserved only over bonus and additional income.
The court distinguished Faton v. Ahmedo, which allowed a section 6344 request after an evidentiary hearing but did not address deadlines or rule 3.1702, because fees there were requested the day the restraining order was granted. It held that A.O. forfeited his request for a remand on good cause to extend time under rule 3.1702(d) because he never raised it in the trial court, and it declined to remand. It also declined to accept a supplemental brief that repeated earlier arguments. The parties bear their own appellate costs.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 3.1702's deadline, the time to file a notice of appeal and at most 180 days, applies to section 6344 fee motions because the statute sets no deadline of its own.
- A stipulated restraining order that resolves competing requests is final for rule 3.1702 purposes even while the dissolution remains pending.
- A fee request in a petition, together with a form order's general reservation of all other issues, does not preserve a fee claim when the settlement record is silent on fees and the orders' fee sections show none.
- A party who never asks the trial court for good-cause relief under rule 3.1702(d) forfeits the issue and cannot obtain a remand for that purpose.
- The opinion's reasoning suggests that parties who want to defer fees should expressly reserve jurisdiction over them on the record, as these parties did for bonus income.
Why It Matters
This published decision confirms that rule 3.1702's fee-motion deadline is not relaxed for Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings. It ties the deadline to the finality of the restraining order rather than the end of the dissolution. A party who prevails on a restraining order request, or defeats one, cannot wait for the broader case to conclude before seeking fees under section 6344.
The ruling addresses a section 6344 request made after a final resolution of competing restraining order requests. It does not decide what happens when the parties or court expressly reserve fee jurisdiction, or when a good-cause showing is timely made below. Because the award was reversed without remand, A.O.'s fee claim is not returned to the trial court.