Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
M.B. was first removed from her mother's care in 2023 at seven months old due to substance abuse and neglect. Mother identified C.F. and R.C.F. as possible fathers; she was married to R.C.F. but unsure he was the biological father. Genetic testing excluded C.F., and in April 2024 M.B. was returned to Mother with jurisdiction terminated.
In April 2025 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a new Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b) petition after Mother's arrest for being under the influence; then-two-year-old M.B. was detained. Mother declared under penalty of perjury that the father was 'unknown,' though R.C.F. was listed as an alleged father. The court had Mother complete a parentage questionnaire and questioned her at the detention and jurisdiction/disposition hearings about her marriage to R.C.F.; the Agency searched for each man she named. On July 14, 2025, the court found R.C.F. to be M.B.'s presumed father.
On December 29, 2025, Mother named A.W. as a possible father. He was added as an alleged father at the January 6, 2026 six-month review hearing, and the Agency began searching for him that day. On March 4, Mother provided a new telephone number, enabling the Agency to contact him. Genetic test results returned on March 26 showed he was M.B.'s biological father. On April 14, A.W. filed a section 388 petition seeking to vacate the prior search-and-notice findings and obtain a new jurisdictional hearing. After considering whether he had made a prima facie showing, the juvenile court summarily denied the petition. It found no sufficient changed circumstances or showing that the requested relief would promote M.B.'s best interests. A.W. appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It treated the adequacy of the parentage inquiry on this undisputed procedural record as a predominantly legal question and applied de novo review, while recognizing that section 388 rulings ordinarily receive abuse-of-discretion review. Section 316.2 requires inquiry into specified topics at the detention hearing or as soon afterward as practicable. Rule 5.635 continues the duty at later hearings, while leaving its particular questions to the court's discretion. Mother's questionnaire covered the statutory topics under penalty of perjury and operated like sworn testimony on those subjects.
The court rejected A.W.'s argument that the inquiry was inadequate because follow-up questions focused on Mother's marriage to R.C.F. Both the statute and the rule expressly include marital-status questions, and that focus was reasonable given the Family Code section 7611 presumption for a child born during marriage. The court also found no inconsistency in Mother's questionnaire responses that called for further probing.
The opinion emphasized repeated inquiry at every substantive hearing, together with continuing Agency efforts. Mother repeatedly said she did not know the biological father's identity while identifying men for investigation. The panel rejected as conjecture the contention that different questioning would have prompted her to identify A.W. earlier. It concluded that the court had fulfilled its initial and continuing statutory inquiry duties, so A.W. had not made the required prima facie showing of an inadequate inquiry.
Key Takeaways
- The questionnaire in this case covered the mandatory section 316.2 topics under penalty of perjury.
- Rule 5.635 continues the parentage inquiry beyond the initial hearing while allowing discretion over particular questions.
- The court assessed Mother's responses, marriage information, and repeated inquiries throughout the proceedings.
- The panel found speculation that different questions would have identified A.W. earlier insufficient on this record.
- De novo review applied to the legal adequacy of this inquiry on undisputed procedural facts, rather than every section 388 ruling.
Why It Matters
The unpublished opinion distinguishes the duty to inquire into parentage from efforts to locate and notify an already identified alleged father. A.W.'s appellate challenge concerned the former; the panel noted that he did not expressly assert a due-process notice claim. Its assessment rested on the actual questionnaire, repeated hearings, and continuing attempts to identify possible fathers.
The result preserves the denial of this section 388 petition. It does not establish that a questionnaire invariably ends a court's inquiry obligations: the opinion separately evaluated the ongoing inquiries required by rule 5.635 and the particular information available in this case.