Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
On May 22, 2025, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received a referral after law enforcement responded to a domestic violence incident at the home of A.M. (Mother) and J.S. (Father). Mother reported that Father had a machine gun and was acting violently while the children were home, despite an active restraining order she said he was "unable to abide by." Records showed 10 domestic violence service calls at the home between July 2024 and June 2025, and her restraining order application described Father slashing tires, breaking doors and windows, pouring gasoline in the garage to set the home on fire, and threatening to have people harmed.
In June 2025, CFS petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(1) as to Alivia M. (born 2016), A.M. (born 2023), and Jasper M. (born 2025), alleging substantial risk of physical harm because Mother allowed Father access to them. At the contested hearings in early February 2026, evidence showed Mother continued communicating with the incarcerated Father, including jailhouse recordings discussing surreptitious contact via a burner phone. She insisted on written-only communication with CFS, refused to discuss what she learned in services, and declined to waive confidentiality for her private therapist, who reported she did not address her role in the removal.
The juvenile court sustained the section 300(b)(1) allegations against both parents (striking one duplicative allegation as to Father) and an amended section 300(g) allegation against Father, removed all three children from both parents, and ordered reunification services. It found clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger to the children if returned home and no reasonable means to protect them short of removal, reasoning that Mother's contacts with the incarcerated Father showed an ongoing relationship and an unbroken pattern of taking him back despite the violence and restraining order.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed, reviewing the removal findings for substantial evidence while accounting for the clear and convincing evidence standard and viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Under section 361(c)(1), removal requires clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger in the home and no reasonable means to protect the child short of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the no-reasonable-means finding as to Mother.
The court rejected Mother's argument that the children could have been placed with her on condition that her family friend Sharon live with them, because social worker Ramirez testified she could not think of any safety plan allowing the children to safely return to Mother. The record showed ample evidence of Mother's unwillingness to cooperate with CFS: written-only communication, refusal to discuss what she learned from services, no waiver for her private therapist, and disregard of visitation and phone rules. The court also reasonably inferred that Mother was not forthright about her relationship with Father, given her admitted jailhouse communications and recordings discussing surreptitious contact while he was incarcerated.
The court distinguished In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208, where the agency failed to show it explored feasible interventions and the parent cooperated. Here there was overwhelming evidence of Mother's refusal to cooperate and lack of candor with both CFS and the court, so the juvenile court could reasonably infer that services and monitoring that might work elsewhere would not protect these children. Father's challenge, contingent on reversal as to Mother, also failed, and the dispositional findings and orders were affirmed as to both parents.
Key Takeaways
- A removal order under section 361(c)(1) is affirmed when substantial evidence shows no reasonable means exist to protect the children short of removal, even if the parent completed some services.
- Refusal to cooperate with the child welfare agency—written-only communication, refusing to discuss services, declining therapist waivers—can support a no-reasonable-means finding.
- Surreptitious communication with an incarcerated violent partner despite a restraining order supports an inference of an ongoing relationship and lack of protective capacity.
- In re L.G. is distinguishable where the parent's own refusal to cooperate and lack of candor, not the agency's failure to explore alternatives, makes removal necessary.
- A father's removal challenge contingent on reversal of the mother's finding fails when the mother's finding is affirmed.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that completing predisposition services alone does not preclude removal when the parent lacks insight, refuses meaningful cooperation, or continues a relationship with a violent partner. It clarifies that In re L.G. does not control where the parent's own conduct makes alternatives infeasible, and it guides juvenile courts on the evidence supporting a no-reasonable-means finding under section 361(c)(1).