Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
R.M. and her husband adopted E.M. in 2024. E.M.'s mother later had J.V., A.S., and K.S., the children involved in this appeal. R.M. sought placement after J.V. was removed from his mother's care and initially received emergency-placement approval, but the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services ultimately declined placement. After the children entered foster care, R.M. began visits, pursued resource-family approval, and identified herself as a nonrelative extended family member. The appellate court assumed that status for purposes of the appeal.
R.M. filed successive section 388 petitions seeking placement of the children with her and her husband. The juvenile court summarily denied December 2024 petitions concerning K.S. and A.S., and an earlier appeal was dismissed as untimely. After R.M. and her husband were approved as a resource family in February 2025, she filed new petitions in May, relying on that approval, the children's relationship with E.M., and the asserted benefits of a stable home and sibling placement. The court denied those petitions for lack of proper service and changed circumstances. It summarily denied a third set in June 2025, finding an insufficient showing of changed circumstances and that the requested placement was not in the children's best interests.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal explained that a section 388 petitioner must show new evidence or changed circumstances and that the proposed modification would serve the child's best interests. A prima facie showing is necessary to obtain an evidentiary hearing. The petition's allegations are liberally construed, but they must describe facts that, if supported by creditable evidence, would sustain a favorable decision. The court may consider the case's entire history and reviews denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion.
R.M. did not argue that the juvenile court erred in finding insufficient changed circumstances or that placement with her would not serve the children's best interests. She instead argued that an NREFM could obtain a hearing by showing failures in the Department's duties to locate relatives and kin and to consider siblings in placement decisions. She relied on In re Isabella G. and In re R.T., but the court held that those decisions concerned the statutory preference for placement with a requesting relative under section 361.3.
The court found no authority establishing that R.M., as the adoptive parent of a minor sibling, qualified as a relative under section 361.3. She was not related to these children by blood or affinity within the fifth degree and had not adopted any of them. Isabella G. and R.T. therefore did not support her claimed entitlement to a hearing. The court also noted that the Department and juvenile court knew about R.M., her husband, and the siblings, and that R.M. had not shown the siblings were insufficiently considered. Concluding that she had established neither error nor abuse of discretion, the court affirmed the juvenile court's orders.
Key Takeaways
- A section 388 petitioner ordinarily must make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or new evidence and best interests before receiving an evidentiary hearing.
- R.M.'s appeal did not challenge the juvenile court's actual findings on changed circumstances and the children's best interests.
- The relative-placement authorities R.M. cited did not establish that an NREFM who adopted a child's sibling was a relative under section 361.3.
- The court also found no showing that the Department or juvenile court had failed to give sufficient consideration to the siblings.
- The summary denials were affirmed because R.M. established neither legal error nor an abuse of discretion.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the established prima facie hearing requirement rather than creating an exception for an NREFM invoking relative-search and sibling-placement duties. Its analysis turns on the scope of section 361.3 and the distinction between that statute's relative-placement preference and R.M.'s assumed NREFM status.
The opinion also reflects the limited record presented: it contained documents R.M. filed in juvenile court, and the court incorporated the record from the earlier dismissed appeal. The court did not independently resolve whether R.M. qualified as an NREFM, instead assuming that status for the appeal.