Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In September 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition alleging that E.J., Sr. inappropriately disciplined his son by repeatedly striking him with an open hand, causing pain, and in an earlier incident inflicting marks and bruises. The petition noted that two siblings had previously been dependents of the juvenile court due to the father's disciplinary practices. Father pled no contest; the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared the child a dependent, removed him from father's care, and ordered reunification services including conjoint counseling, a parenting program, and monitored visits.
At the November 2025 12-month status review hearing conducted under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f), the Department recommended terminating reunification services, and the child's counsel joined that recommendation. Father's counsel requested a six-month extension and argued the Department had not provided reasonable services. The juvenile court found the Department had provided reasonable services and terminated reunification services. Father timely appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court held a permanency planning review hearing on August 12, 2026, found the child had turned 18, and declared him a nonminor dependent. The Court of Appeal granted the Department's request for judicial notice of that minute order.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Department that the appeal was moot. Under In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, a case becomes moot when events make it impossible to grant effective relief, which requires both an ongoing harm and a harm redressable by the outcome the appellant seeks. Because the child was now 18, he could not be ordered to reunify with his father. The court relied on In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, section 303, subdivision (d)(1), and Family Code section 7505, subdivision (c), confirming that a parent cannot have custody of an adult and parental authority ends at majority.
The court rejected father's argument that the termination finding could adversely affect reunification services for any future younger sibling under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A). Father identified no other child subject to dependency jurisdiction, and the siblings referenced in the petition were now adults, making the claim too speculative to demonstrate a specific legal consequence a favorable judgment could redress. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to reach the merits, finding no issue of broad public interest likely to recur, no likely recurrence between the parties, and no material question remaining.
Father had separately argued the juvenile court failed to comply with its duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act, but he conceded in a supplemental brief that this argument was moot. The court dismissed the appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A parent's appeal from an order terminating reunification services becomes moot once the child turns 18, because California law does not permit a parent to reunify with or have custody of an adult child.
- To avoid mootness, an appellant must show both an ongoing harm and that the harm is capable of being redressed by the relief sought, the two-part test drawn from In re D.P.
- Speculative claims that a termination finding might affect reunification services for hypothetical future siblings are insufficient to keep an appeal alive when no other child is subject to dependency jurisdiction and existing siblings are adults.
- Appellate courts retain discretion to decide moot cases presenting issues of broad public interest likely to recur, but will not exercise that discretion absent a showing of recurrence potential or a remaining material question.
- A party's concession that an argument is moot, as father made regarding his Indian Child Welfare Act claim, effectively removes that issue from appellate review.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision reinforces the practical finality of dependency timelines: because reunification services are legally tethered to a child's minority, a parent whose appeal outlasts the child's 18th birthday risks losing any meaningful appellate remedy. The opinion applies In re D.P. to confirm that the collateral-consequences exception to mootness demands a concrete, non-speculative stake, not merely the possibility that a finding could matter in some future proceeding.
For juvenile dependency practitioners, the case underscores the importance of seeking expedited appellate review when a child is nearing majority, and it illustrates how courts treat ICWA arguments that become moot alongside the underlying reunification dispute.